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Chinese Communist Army flag and star. The flag is red, with the 
star and symbols in yellow. These symbols are a conventionalized form of 
the Chinese characters "8-1". The figures "8-1," signifying the eighth 
month and first day (1 August 1927), commemorate the founding of the 
Chinese Communist Army. The five-pointed star is red with yellow border. 
The inscription is the Chinese characters for "8-1". 
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THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY 
CHAPTER 1. THE ARMED FORCES 
Section I. INTRODUCTION 
1. COMPOSITION OF THE ARMED FORCES 
The Armed Forces of Communist China-the 
People's Liberation Army (PLA) I-consist of 
ground, naval, and air elements. The ground 
forces total approximately 2,600,000 and con-
tain about 90 percent of the total manpower 
of the PLA; the navy and air force comprise 
only approximately 2 percent and 3 percent of 
the PLA strength, respectively. 
2. CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES 
The Minister of National Defense directly 
commands the Chinese Communist Armed 
Forces through six, or perhaps eight, staff de-
partments which serve as a "general staff" 
within the ministry (fig. 2). Immediately sub-
ordinate to the ministry and its staff depart-
ments are the Air Force Headquarters, Naval 
Headquarters, Public Security Forces Head-
quarters, Air Defense Command, and at least 
six headquarters for ground arms and services 
-Armor, Artillery, Engineer, Railway Engi-
neer, Signal, and Technical Services Head-
quarters. There is no overall "Ground Force 
Headquarters" or "Infantry Headquarters" as 
such; in addition to performing "general staff" 
functions for the Armed Forces as a whole, the 
staff departments of the Ministry of National 
Defense also serve as ground force and infantry 
headquarters. This directly reflects the essen-
tially infantry and ground force character of 
Figure 1. Chinese Communist Infantrymen. 
1 The terms "Chinese Communist Army". HCCA", and "Army". as used herein. are synonymous with ground forces as distinguished 
from the "People's Liberation Army", which is the Chinese Communists' term for their Armed Forces as a whole. 
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the original PLA and its officers. It is also char-
acteristic of the present military establishment, 
which is essentially an infantry force with spe-
cialized service and support elements, and to 
which have been added relatively small air and 
naval components. The Ministry of National 
Defense, the staff departments, and the subordi-
nate headquarters of arms and services com-
prise, in sum, the command and administrative 
organization to which the Chinese Communists 
refer as "Headquarters, People's Liberation 
Army". 
3. "THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY" 
a. Ground Forces of the "People's Liberation 
Army". The Chinese Communist ground forces 
have traditionally played the dominant role in 
the Armed Forces. Their primary missions are 
the defense of China, maintenance of internal 
security, and the implementation of Chinese 
Communist international policies by force if 
necessary. The principal peacetime ground 
force commands are the military regions which 
control the armies, independent divisions, and 
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE 
GENERAL STAFF 
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Figure 2. Armed Forces Organization. 
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separate units. In time of war, the ground 
forces are organized into integrated combat 
commands which function independently from 
the military regions. 
b. The Naval Forces of the People's Libera-. 
tion Army. Communist China's navy has been 
slow to develop beyond a coastal defense force. 
Equipment is limited and experience almost 
lacking except for the last 10 years when the 
Communists' area of influence included China's 
coastline. The various fleets, aviation units, 
marines, bases, and depots are directly under 
the naval district commands which are under 
Naval Headquarters of the Headquarters, PLA. 
The district commands are subdivided into Base 
Commands for command of specified areas. In 
addition to a limited capability for coastal de-
fense, the Navy has a small amphibious lift and 
deep-water capability. 
c. The Air Forces of the People's Liberation 
Army. The Chinese Communist Air Force be-
gan with the arrival of Soviet advisory and 
material assistance in 1950. Since that time it 
has increased in size but is still relatively in-
ferior in pilot training. The Air Force Head-
quarters controls the air units which are or-
ganized into air divisions, independent air 
regiments, and logistical units. Air head-
quarters are located in each military region, 
but their function is usually limited to adminis-
tration. However, in some instances, partic-
ularly those requiring a defensive reaction, 
regional air headquarters commanders have 
operational control of units within their area. 
d. Para-Military Forces. The para-military 
forces of Communist China include the militia, 
the production and construction units, and the 
National Defense Athletic Club. The militia, 
totaling about 30,000,000, is the largest of this 
group and includes a large percentage of the 
physically fit young men and women who are 
considered polit~cally reliable. The production 
and construction units are primarily engaged 
in agricultural production and conservation and 
construction projects. The National Defense 
Athletic Club, found almost entirely in the 
cities, is an organization providing young people 
with instruction and experience in activities 
that might prove useful to the military; e.g., 
gliding, marksmanship, radio, and camping. 
Section II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
4. ORIGIN OF THE ARMY 
a. During the many years of struggle for 
control of China, the PLA has been the military 
arm of the Chinese Communist Party. The PLA 
leaders have also been Party leaders, especially 
since 1931, and the histories of the PLA and of 
the Party are inseparable. The Party's first big 
opportunity to build its strength came in 1923, 
when Nationalist leader SUN Yat-sen,2 after 
his appeals for aid from the West had been re-
jected, accepted Soviet offers of military aid. 
b. In return for this Soviet aid, the Na-
tionalists agreed to cooperate with the Chinese 
Communist Party. The Communists actively 
participated in the program of the new Wham-
poa Military Academy, which, upon Soviet rec-
ommendation, had been established in 1924 to 
furnish the Nationalist Army with a modern 
and politically indoctrinated officer corps. Many 
members of the PLA's present high command 
were either faculty members or students at 
Whampoa during the years 1924 to 1926. 
Through their connections with the Academy, 
the Communists were able to influence the as-
signments of Communist and pro-Communist 
graduates and thereby build up strong cadres of 
Communist officers in selected Nationalist units, 
commanded by sympathetic generals. 
c. Following a break between the Nationalists 
and the Communists in 1927, Chinese Na-
tionalist Army units, commanded by Communist 
and pro-Communist officers, revolted at Nan-
chang on 1 August 1927. This revolt marked 
the birth of the Chinese Communist Army, (fig. 
3) • 
2 The Chinese syStem of giving an individual's family or surname first and his given names last will be used in this study. When 
a person's full name is given, his surname will be in capital letters. 
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Figure>3.Bidh of the Chinese Comunist Army, 1 August 1927. 
This army fought against the Nationalists in a 
desperate struggletosurvive)nthe JTears 1927 
to 1936, gained strength during the years of 
",arwith Japan from 1937 to 1945, and in the 
renewed civil war Jrom 1946 to 1949 was abI~. 
to drive the Nationalists from the mainland of 
China. 
DEVELOPMENT .OF GUERRILLA TACTICS 
a.Fro1l11927 to 1931, the majority of the 
Chinese YOIl1m.unist Party lead~rs ;:tnd the Third 
I~t~~IlationaLpla~ne<l for revolution in China 
aro~n<i the .classic S()'Viet doct~ine. of uprisings 
Qf ..  thei~du~trial .. workers-the .. urban proletari-
at .• This strategy, however, resulted in seri.ous 
s~tl)acks for the Chinese. Communist movelllent, 
including the loss of the .Il1ost of .its Jollowers 
among the urban workers. In 1931, the Chinese 
Communist Party decided to stake the future of 
its movement upoll the . Chinese . peasant and an 
agrarian revolution. This reversal of the basic 
Communist political strategy had far-reaching-
military consequences, for from . this decision 
the Chinese Communist Army's basic doctrines 
of strategy, organization, and tactics were de-
veloped. 
b. The leading advocates of this neW Com-
munist strategy were MAO Tse-tung and CHU 
Teh, two r;:tnking leaders in Comlllunist China 
today. In 1931, these two collaborated in estab-
lishing a Communist base, complete with army 
and civil administration, in mountainous south-
eastern China. MAO's early Communist iParty 
activities had centered around organizing peas-
ants in his native province of Hunan. CHU 
was an experienced army officer who. had 
learned his first lessons .. in guerrilla warfare 
while fighting bandits on the China-Indochina 
border. The MAO-CHU strategy was based on 
the fact that, from the earliest period of its 
history, China had been ruled from the strong-
holds of about a thousand walled towns, which 
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were the seats of government and wealth, and 
headquarters of military garrisons. The Com-
munists reasoned that, if they could organize 
the peas.ants in the villages-arming them for 
their own defense-they eventually could isolate 
the walled cities from a Communist-controlled 
countryside. The mission of the Communist 
Army was to extend and to protect the areas 
of Communist control. 
c. The MAO-CHU strategy required that the 
Communist Army establish a firm community 
of interest with the peasants to insure for itself 
recruits, food, and security against surprise 
attacks. In return, the Communist Army ini-
tially offered the peasant land-at the expense 
of the landlord-and, by Chinese standards, an 
efficient government, equitable taxes, humane 
treatment, some voice in his government, and 
protection against his enemies. This Communist 
strategy was built around the concepts of "bid-
ing one's time", of striking where the enemy is 
weak, and of heavy dependence on the militia 
and other local forces. 
d. MAO Tse-tung studied the classical princi-
ples of warfare and analyzed their application 
to the situation facing the Communists in 
China. His Strategic Problems of China's Revo-
lutionary War, published in 1936, became the 
handbook of all Communist field commanders. 
MAO summarizes his strategic concepts as fol-
lows: 
"We are against guerrillaism [sic] ... yet we 
must admit the Army's guerrilla character. We are 
opposed to protracted [individual] campaigns . . . 
while we believe in campaigns of quick decision and 
a strategy of protracted war. Since we are opposed 
to fixed operational fronts and positional warfare, 
we believe in unified operational fronts and a war 
of maneuver. We are against simply routing the 
enemy, and we believe in a war of annihilation." 
e. Between 1930 and the end of 1933, the 
Communists in southeastern China were sub-
jected to a series of five military offensives. The 
last campaign substantially reduced the Com-
munist-held territory, inflicted heavy losses on 
the Communist forces, and left them encircled 
and vulnerable. Faced with probable extermi-
nation, the Communists decided to break 
through the Nationalist cordon and establish a 
new base elsewhere. In October 1934, the Com-
munist forces, numbering about 90,000, began 
their epic "Long March". In October 1935, 
after a march of more than 6,000 miles during 
which they were under almost constant attack, 
about 20,000 survivors arrived in the arid and 
poverty-stricken hill country of Shensi Province 
in northwestern China. Toward the end of 1936 
the Nationalists were about to launch a military 
campaign against the Shensi base area. Only 
the formation of the "United Front" against 
Japan prevented the launching of this cam-
paign, which probably would have either "ex-
terminated" the Communist forces or forced 
them to begin another "long march". 
f. By the end of the "Long March", MAO and 
CHU were firmly in control of both the Chinese 
Communist Party and its Army. Following 
their basic strategy of "biding their time", 
these leaders in 1935 and 1936 urged a joint 
Nationalist-Communist "United Front against 
Japan". There was, at this time, strong senti-
ment among many of the Nationalist command-
ers in favor of directing the Nationalist mili-
tary effort against the Japanese rather than 
against the Communists. In December 1936, 
Nationalist leader CHIANG Kai-shek was kid-
napped by a group of his commanders and 
forced to agree to a truce with the Communists 
and to a "United Front". 
6. THE WAR WITH JAPAN 
a. The Sino-Japanese War offered the Chi-
nese Communists an excellent opportunity to 
apply their strategy of building their strength 
in the countryside and to expand their Army 
for the final showdown with the Nationalists. 
Under the "United Front" agreements, the 
Communist Army was nominally integrated 
into the Chinese National Army and acquired 
a new name, the Eighth Route Army. This 
force was nominally subordinate to the Na-
tionalist Headquarters in North China. In fact, 
however, the Communists remained independ-
ent of Nationalist control even though the fic-
tion of "joint cooperation" against Japan was 
maintained until after the Japanese surrender 
in August 1945. 
b. When the Japanese Army overran most of 
North China in 1937, the three divisions then 
comprising the Communist Eighth Route Army 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
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stayed behind to organize guerrilla resistance 
throughout the area. The Nationalists first ap-
proved, but later opposed, this expansion of the 
Communist zone of operations. The Commu-
nists ignored Nationalist protests, however, and 
exploited the confused situation in North China 
by expanding and consolidating their positions 
there. Outside the Japanese areas of control in 
North China, the Communists absorbed Na-
tionalist and local anti-Japanese elements where 
they could and drove out or destroyed those that 
resisted. By August 1945, virtually all Na-
tionalist elements in North China either had 
been eliminated or absorbed by the Commu-
nists, or had joined the Japanese as "puppets" 
to administer or garrison Japanese-held lines 
of communication. The Communists generally 
avoided large battles against the Japanese, but, 
by a process of continued attrition, they nar-
rowed the areas of Japanese control to the prin-
cipal cities and relatively narrow zones along 
main lines of communication. 
c. Thus, between 1937 and 1945 the Chinese 
Communist Army expanded rapidly through 
application of the strategic principles developed 
earlier by MAO and CHU. In 1937 the Com-
munist Army had numbered only about 100,000, 
and it controlled barren areas containing a 
poverty-striken population of about 2,000,000. 
By 1947 the Communist Army had grown to 
over 1,000,000 regulars, with a reserve of over 
2,000,000 local troops and militia, and it con-
trolled a population of 90,000,000 in one of the 
richest agricultural areas of China. This zone 
of Communist domination in 1945 cut across the 
Nationalists' lines of approach from their 
Yangtze River Valley positions in central China 
to the northern cities of Peiping and Tientsin, 
and to the strategic northeastern provinces. 
7. DEFEAT OF THE NATIONALISTS 
a. Immediately following Japan's surrender 
in August 1945, the Nationalists and Commu-
nists began a struggle for control of North 
China and Manchuria. At the time of her sur-
render, Japan was in control of all the principal 
cities, most of the more important walled 
county seats, and all of the railroads in North 
China. Most of the Communist troops were 
located in North China, whereas most of the 
Nationalist armies were still south of the 
Yangtze River. The Japanese Army in China 
received orders to surrender only to the N a-
tional Government troops, and their Chinese 
"puppet" troops were to be incorporated into 
the Nationalist Army. Some Nationalist armies 
were airlifted to Peiping, Tientsin, and Tsinan, 
while others attempted to drive northward from 
Hankow and Nanking via the railroads. 
b. The Communists countered by cutting the 
railroads. By the end of 1945, the military situ-
ation was a temporary stalemate, with the 
Nationalists unable to move their forces for-
ward and the Communists incapable of doing 
more than holding the Nationalists where they 
were. 
c. During the winter of 1945 and the spring 
and summer of 1946 the Nationalists and Com-
munists engaged in negotiations under the 
chairmanship of General George C. Marshall. 
The negotiations were aimed at preventing a 
civil war by effecting a cease-fire, a coalition 
Government, and the integration of the Com-
munist Army into the Nationalist military 
establishment. Fighting continued sporadically 
during these negotiations, and the Communists 
used this period to reorganize and regroup. 
When the cease-fire negotiations finally broke 
down in the summer of 1946, the Nationalists 
launched their first concerted drive to clear the 
approaches to North China. The Nationalists 
achieved limited initial successes, but they 
failed to destroy the Communist forces and to 
establish overland communications with their 
forces in north and northeast China. In the 
course of these failures, the Nationalists lost a 
large number of their best divisions. 
d. During the summer of 1947 the Commu-
nists overran southern Shensi Province. Later 
they launched bold attacks against the Na-
tionalists between the Yellow and the Yangtze 
Rivers. During this period the Communists 
seized the strategic initiative, an advantage 
which they never lost. Communist operations 
during this period subjected the Nationalist 
forces to further attrition and prevented them 
from implementing any effective plan of opera-
tions. 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
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e. During this period the Communist leaders 
demonstrated their mastery of the principles of 
surprise, mobility, flexibility, and economy of 
force, and proved that they were learning the 
.art of employing large forces successfully. 
f. During the struggle for North China, the 
Nationalists and Communists were battling also 
for control of Manchuria. Following Japan's 
surrender, selected Communist cadres marched 
overland into Manchuria from North China or 
were carried by junks from Shantung Province 
via Soviet~held Dairen. The Nationalists water~ 
lifted their best United States-trained and 
-equipped armies from Shanghai and Canton to 
North China ports. Initially the Soviets pre~ 
vented the Nationalist units from occupying 
Manchuria by postponing their own with-
drawal; they subsequently withdrew from key 
areas after Communist forces were in position 
and the Nationalists had to fight their way in. 
By the end of April 1946, the Nationalists held 
most of southern Manchuria and had recovered 
central Manchuria up to the Sungari River, 
north of Changchun. The Communists, how~ 
ever, still controlled agriculturally rich north-
ern Manchuria and dominated the Nationalists' 
flanks. 
g. The Soviet withdrawal from Manchuria in 
1946 was so timed as to permit a large stock of 
captured Japanese weapons to fall into Com~ 
munist hands. The Soviets also denied Dairen 
and its port facilities to the Nationalists. The 
situation in Manchuria eventually worked out 
in favor of the Communists and against the 
over-extended Nationalists. The Communists 
had a base area which included adequate food 
resources and manpower, plus an arms supply 
sufficient to equip an army of nearly 500,000 
men. Of still greater importance, for the first 
time in their 20 years of fighting, a Communist 
Army was in possession of a network of rail-
roads and highways, giving it the capability of 
supporting large-scale operations. The Com-
munists built up an army of more than 400,000 
in Manchuria and employed large units against 
Nationalist positions. By the end of 1948, they 
had destroyed the United States-equipped Na~ 
tionalist armies in Manchuria, thereby acquir-
ing large quantities of United States weapons 
and equipment. It was this Communist Man~ 
churian Army that later was designated the 
Fourth Field Army and which initially supplied 
the backbone of the Chinese Communist "volun-
teer" forces in Korea . 
h. In September 1948, the Communists began 
what was to become the decisive offensive. The 
Communist forces severed the corridor connect~ 
ing North China and Manchuria. The Commu~ 
nists, on 30 October, occupied the principal 
Nationalist stronghold following the total de~ 
struction of 14 Nationalist divisions that were 
attempting to break through southward into 
North China. 
i. From November 1948 to January 1949 the 
main forces of the Communist and Nationalist 
armies around Hsuchow, 200 miles north of 
Nanking, were locked in the largest single battle 
of the civil war; each side committed an esti-
mated 500,000 men. The Nationalist armies 
were cut off, surrounded, and destroyed. In 
North China, Communist troops from Man-
churia appeared before the gates of Peiping on 
14 December 1948, after a swift and undetected 
march through the mountains of J ehol Province, 
and caught the Nationalists with their forces 
widely dispersed. Tientsin fell to the Commu-
nists on 15 January 1949; Peiping surrendered 
on 22 January. From this time on, the Com~ 
munist forces outnumbered those of the Na-
tionalists. 
j. Under a strong public pressure to end the 
civil war, CHIANG Kai-shek, President of the 
Republic of China, "retired" on 21 January 
1949. He was succeeded by General LI Tsung-
jen, the Vice President, who sent a commission 
to Peiping to negotiate with the Communists. 
Meanwhile, the Communists proceeded to ex-
tend and consolidate their control over the re-
maining territory north of the Yangtze River, 
and by April 1949 they were poised for a cross-
ing of the Yangtze. 
k. The Communists, on 18 April 1949, issued 
an ultimatum demanding that the Nationalists 
surrender by 20 April and that the Communist 
forces be permitted to occupy certain key areas 
on the south bank of the Yangtze. This ulti-
matum was rejected, and the Communist forces 
crossed the Yangtze in force during the night of 
AGO l0012A 
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20-21 April and moved swiftly to surround the 
Nationalist forces or force them into retreat. 
Nanking fell to the Communists without a fight 
on 24 April; they occupied Hanchow, south of 
Shanghai, on 5 May. Shanghai, where a Na-
tionalist force of from 200,000 to 300,000 
offered half-hearted resistance, was occupied by 
the Communists on 25 May. Of the Nationalist 
troops in Shanghai, it is estimated that only 
50,000 managed to escape and reach Taiwan. 
l. The remaining campaigns of the civil war 
were, in effect, mopping-up operations. The 
Communist armies now numbered approxi-
mately 2,500,000 men. The Nationalists-now 
holding only Taiwan and a few small islands 
along the China coast-had been able to salvage 
a force totaling 500,000 to 600,000. 
m. For the Chinese Communist forces, the 
period 1947 through 1949 was one of gradual 
transition toward more orthodox and more 
nearly uniform organization. In early 1947, the 
Chinese Communists had three major com-
mands, the Eighth Route Army, the New 
Fourth Army, and the Northeast People's 
United Army. By mid-1947, the units had been 
reorganized and renamed the People's Libera-
tion Armies designated according to the geo-
graphic areas in which they were operating, 
such as the "East China People's Liberation 
Army". Subordinate tactical units of the armies 
were designated as numbered "Columns", which 
were composed of a variable number of either 
divisions or brigades, none of which had either 
uniform strength or organization. During early 
1949, the area-designated Liberation Armies 
were reorganized into five major commands, the 
First to Fifth Field Armies. Under the Field 
Armies were Army Groups serving as adminis-
trative headquarters for several armies which 
had been reorganized and redesignated in nu-
merical sequence from the old "Columns". The 
armies were organized triangularly into three 
divisions of three regiments each. The Fifth 
Field Army subsequently was deactivated, but 
the basic Field Army-Army Group-Army-Divi-
sion-Regiment structure remained. The 1949 
reorganization did not entirely eliminate either 
inequalities in unit strength or the nonuniform-
ity of organization, but the irregularity was 
reduced and the trend toward more nearly uni-
form and orthodox organizations was estab-
lished. The Chinese Communist forces were, 
however, still deficient in artillery, armor, 
transport, and other supporting services. 
8. STATUS AT THE END OF THE CIVil WAR 
a. The Communist Army which emerged 
from the civil war was far from being a modern 
army. Its high command had demonstrated a 
sound grasp of the principles of warfare and a 
high degree of flexibility in their application. 
The Communist leaders had achieved and ex-
ploited superior mobility and taken full advan-
tage of the opportunities for maneuver offered 
by the terrain of mainland China. 
b. Capabilities in other phases of warfare, 
however, remained to be tested. The Commu-
nists had had little experience in penetrating 
strongly defended positions and even less exper-
ience in the protracted defense of a geograph-
ically restricted area. They had never developed 
a supply organization capable of giving logis-
tical support to these phases of warfare. In 
their constant emphasis on retaining a maxi-
mum degree of mobility, they had discouraged 
elaborately organized lines of communications. 
Communist armies in the field tried to live off 
the country and depended to a large extent for 
arms and ammunition upon captured supplies. 
In brief, the Communists had yet to develop a 
logistical organization capable of sustaining 
their forces in modern military operations. 
c. In October 1949, the Chinese Communists 
established the People's Republic of China (fig. 
4). On 14 February 1950, they entered into a 
30-year "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and 
Mutual Assistance" with the Soviet Union, and 
by early March major contingents of the Soviet 
advisory missions began arriving in China. 
9. THE KOREAN WAR 
a. The Chinese Communist Army in 1950 
was still essentially a mass of infantrymen 
armed with rifles and small quantities of auto-
matic weapons. It had inadequate artillery sup-
port and an extremely haphazard logistic serv-
ice. Nevertheless, to prevent the collapse of the 
Communist regime in North Korea, the Chinese 
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Figure 4. Mao Tse-tung Announces lhe Birth of lhe 
If People's Republic of Chinalf, 1 October 1949. 
Communist forces crossed the Yalu River to 
attack United Nations forces in late November 
1950. By so doing, they bear the unique distinc-
tion of being the only force openly to challenge 
the United Nations in military operations. 
b. The first Chinese Communist troops com-
mitted in Korea came from the Fourth Field 
Army. This "volunteer" contingent, composed 
Qf veterans who had participated in much of the 
fighting against the Chinese Nationalists from 
Manchuria to South China, was considered the 
elite of the Chinese Communist Army. Troops 
from other field armies soon entered the con-
flict; and, by the summer of 1953, when the 
truce was signed about one-third of the 
Chinese Communist Army was in Korea. 
c. The Chinese Communists in Korea were 
successful initially, because of their overwhelm-
ing numbers. At the outset, their "human sea" 
tactics kept the numerically smaller United 
Nations forces off balance. However, because 
of logistic weaknesses the Chinese Communists 
could sustain their offensive less than 10 con-
secutive days, after which the troops were 
forced to regroup and wait for resupply. Reli-
ance on the "human sea" tactics finally proved 
inadequate against forces possessing adequate 
firepower and logistic support, and the Chinese 
Communists were unable to fulfill their pledge 
to "drive the enemy into the sea". Their ex-
perience in Korea reemphasized to the Com-
munists that their Army needed much improve-
ment before it could compete successfully 
against a modern, well-organized, and well-
equipped military force. 
10. THE ARMY REORGANIZES 
a. The history of the Chinese Communist 
Army has been one of continual evolution. In 
late 1950, with advisory missions and modern 
equipment from the Soviet Union, the Com-
munists undertook a new program, which 
reached its climax in late 1952 and early 1953, 
and which had the following three objectives: 
(1) To form a well-balanced army by cre-
ating service and support units and 
providing for better training and con-
trol over these units. 
(2) To weed out over-age and disabled 
personnel and former Chinese Na-
t ionalists who had failed to respond 
to Communist indoctrination, and to 
replace them with younger, more phys-
ically fit, and more politically reliable 
men. 
(3) To establish an effective fighting force 
by reducing the number of units and 
by increasing the strength of remain-
ing units. 
b. The program resulted in a sharp reduction 
in the number of infantry units between 1950 
and 1955, but a slight concurrent increase in 
overall strength attributable in part to the for-
mation of new noninfantry units and in part 
to the increased strength of the remaining in-
fantry units. Since the Chinese Communists 
already had sufficient trained infantrymen, their 
chief concern was the creation of support ele-
ments such as artillery, armored, engineer, and 
signal units. These new organizations were 
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formed around cadres provided by existing 
units. The Soviet Union furnished some of the 
instructors and most of the equipment for these 
new units. Headquarters were established at 
the PLA level for the supporting arms and 
technical services to develop the tactical doc-
trine and training programs for their respec-
tive arms or services. Operational control of 
units, however, remained with the regional 
commanders. 
c. The new program resulted in a significant 
expansion in heavy firepower. This was ac-
complished by a substantial increase in the 
number of artillery units and a change to larger 
caliber artillery. Artillery technique, although 
considerably improved over that of 1950, still 
lacked flexibility because of poor communica-
tions, concept of employment, and technical 
deficiencies. 
d. During the Korean War, most of the equip-
ment from the Soviet Union was issued to forces 
in Korea, and personnel of many units in China 
proper were used as replacements for the forces 
in Korea. Consequently, as units in China fell 
far below authorized strength, some were de-
activated and their personnel used to bring the 
remaining units up to strength. CHU Teh, in 
an Army Anniversary speech on 1 August 1953, 
summarized the developments as follows: "A 
regular training program is being carried 
through in the People's Liberation Army, and 
the great historic transition of the People's 
Liberation Army from its lower stage to a 
higher stage has begun." 
Section III. THE ARMY TODAY 
11. GENERAL 
The Chinese Communists have organized, 
equipped, and trained a modern army of over 
2,500,000 men, in addition to a steadily im-
proving Navy and the fourth largest Air Force 
in the world. The ground forces only now are 
reaching approximately the level attained by 
those of Western Powers during World War II. 
They depend heavily on the Soviet Union for 
logistical support, but in size they rank second 
only to those of the Soviet Union and would 
constitute a formidable opponent. 
12. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
a. The greatest strength of the Chinese Com-
munist Army lies in China's huge manpower 
resources. In addition, the expansion of the 
militia program since mid-1958 has given 
limited training to many potential recruits. 
Since 1954 the conscription system has permit-
ted the release of some 500,000 to 800,000 
trained men a year into the reserves, ready for 
call in an emergency. The average soldier 
is outstanding in stamina, endurance, and the 
ability to withstand the most adverse condi-
tions. Lack of a technical background in its 
recruits, however, will continue for some time 
to complicate the training problem of the CCA 
and to be its greatest personnel weakness. 
b. In organization and equipment the CCA 
has taken great strides forward since the 
Korean War. The Soviet Union, by furnishing 
great quantities of material and the example of 
Soviet organizational patterns, has been of im-
measurable assistance. Actual organization of 
units, however, is still far from the ideal table 
of organization in many cases, and equipment 
still falls far short of the quantity required 
for an Army of the size maintained by the 
Chinese Communists. Although Communist 
China is increasing its capability to fill some 
of its own needs, continuing Soviet support will 
be necessary for the indefinite future; in any 
operations of the scale of the Korean War or 
larger, massive Soviet aid would be required. 
c. Discipline and esprit de corps in the 
Chinese Communist Army are maintained by 
indoctrination and political control by the Party 
at every echelon. An estimated 90 percent of 
the officers of field grade or above, 30 percent 
of the junior officers, and 10 percent of the 
noncommissioned officers are Party members. 
Youth Corps membership, in the lower ranks, 
is even more widespread. These affiliations in-
sure close Party supervision of every aspect 
of daily activity and even of thought and atti-
tude throughout the Army. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE MILITARY SYSTEM 
Section I. THE HIGH COMMAND 
13. GENERAL 
a. Top control of the Armed Forces is vested 
constitutionally in the National People's Con-
gress (legislature) or, when the Congress is 
not in session, in its Standing Committee. The 
Congress elects the Chairman of the People's 
Republic of China who is ex officio Commander 
in Chief of the Armed Forces and Chairman of 
the National Defense Council-a policy-making 
advisory and planning organization whose 
membership is chosen by the Congress upon 
recommendation of the Chairman of the 
People's Republic. The National People's Con-
gress, or its Standing Committee, selects the 
members (Premier, Vice Premiers, Ministers, 
and Heads of Commissions) of the State Council 
(cabinet), of which the Ministry of Defense is 
a part (fig. 5). 
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b. Overall policy for the Armed Forces is 
formulated by the Chinese Communist Party 
through its Politburo and the Party's Military 
Affairs Committee which makes all important 
military policy decisions with Politburo ap-
proval. Policy control of the Armed Forces is 
effected through the Party's control of the com-
position of the National People's Congress, its 
Standing Committee, and the State Council, 
and through the direct Party control of political 
organization within the Armed Forces. 
14. HEADQUARTERS, PEOPLE'S LIBERATION 
ARMY 
a. General. The Ministry of National De-
fense, its "general staff" departments, and the 
headquarters of the arms and services comprise 
the top command and administrative organiza-
tion generally known as "Headquarters, People's 
Liberation Army" (fig. 2). 
b. The Minister of National Defense directly 
commands the Armed Forces. The position has 
been held by a Marshal since 1954 when the 
position was established, and the Minister has 
served, concurrently, as a Vice Premier of the 
State Council and a Vice Chairman of the Na-
tional Defense Council. He is assisted by sev-
eral Vice Ministers who, concurrently, hold 
high rank in the Armed Forces, and mO::5t of 
whom are members of the National Defense 
Council. Most of the routine functions of the 
Ministry are conducted by the "general staff" 
departments and by the headquarters of the 
arms and services which serve as the principal 
planning, coordinating, and executive agencies 
of the Ministry and which have technical chains 
of command to counterpart departments and 
headquarters in the subordinate echelons. 
c. The Headquarters, PLA has no "General 
Staff" in the generally accepted sense of the 
term. Instead, the Ministry of National De-
fense has a number of staff departments, most 
of which are designated as "General" depart-
ments, which perform for the Armed Forces 
the functions usually performed by a "General 
Staff" . 
(1) The General Staff Department is the 
principal agency for coordinating the 
combat operations of the major serv-
ices, commands, and ground arms. It 
contains divisions that are concerned 
with operations, military intelligence, 
and tactical organization. This depart-
ment is headed by the Chief of General 
Staff; but, just as the General Staff 
Department is not the General Staff 
but only one of the several depart-
ments performing general staff func-
tions, the Chief of General Staff is not 
the Chief of the General Staff but only 
Chief of the General Staff Depart-
ment. 
(2) The General Political DepaTtment 
probably is the most powerful of the 
"general staff" departments. It is the 
senior agency within the PLA through 
which the Chinese Communist Party 
exercises political control and surveil-
lance over policy and personnel. It 
performs its functions through its own 
separate channel of administration 
and command which parallels the mili-
tary command channel. According to 
the Party Constitution, the General 
Political Department ad min i s t e r s 
Party ideological and organizational 
work in the Armed Forces under the 
leadership of the Party's Central Com-
mittee. It is responsible for the Party 
organization, propaganda, education, 
cultural activities, and personnel secu-
rity within the Armed Forces and for 
the organization of the civil populace 
(military government) in time of 
emergency. 
(3) The GeneTal Rear SeTvice DepaTtment 
is the logistical department for the 
Armed Forces. It is responsible for 
logistical planning and the delegation 
of logistical responsibilities to sub-
ordinate commands. It determines the 
major materiel requirements, manages 
the military establishment's procure-
ment plan, and is responsible for mat-
ters pertaining to the Armed Forces 
budget. The Department has divisions 
for quartermaster, medical, veterinary, 
ordnance, transportation, supply, and 
fuel services. It may include a finance 
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division, although, for at least a brief 
period in the mid-1950's, finance was 
the responsibility of a General Fi-
nance Department which may no 
longer exist. 
(4) The General Training Department for-
mulates overall policies for the train-
ing of the Armed Forces and for co-
ordinating the military education of 
Armed Forces personnel. It exercises 
staff supervision over the national 
military schools controlled by the Min-
istry of National Defense, over the 
training installations of the military 
area commands, and over the training 
programs developed by the headquar-
ters of the various arms and services. 
(5) The General Cadres Department is re-
sponsible for the routine personnel ad-
ministration for Armed Forces per-
sonnel other than political personnel 
who are administered by the General 
Political Department. 
(6) The Armed Forces Supervisory De-
partment monitors combat readiness 
throughout the military establishment 
and assures that military training is 
properly planned and executed. The 
inquiries of this department probably 
do not include inspection of the activ-
ities of the General Political Depart-
ment and its subordinate agencies, 
and probably is not concerned with 
morale, grievances, fiscal matters, or 
general administration. 
(7) The status of the General Ordnance 
Department and Mobilization Depart-
ment is not known. The General Ord-
nance Department was, and still may 
be, a separate staff department, prob-
ably responsible for liaison with the 
First Ministry of Machine Building 
which is responsible for military pro-
duction. If this department no longer 
exists, its functions probably were re-
turned to the General Rear Service 
Department which previously had 
them. The Mobilization Department, 
sometimes referred to as the General 
Mobilization Department, was prima-
rily concerned with formulation and 
supervision of policy for the militia 
and reserves. There is some doubt as 
to whether the department still exists 
or whether its functions have been 
absorbed by other departments. 
d. The headquarters of the arms and services 
at the PLA level include the Air Defense Com-
mand: Air Force Headquarters; Naval Head-
quarters; Public Security Forces Headquarters; 
and a headquarters for armor, artillery, engi-
neer, railway engineer, signal, and technical 
services. There is no separate headquarters 
for the ground forces or for the infantry arm, 
but the several general departments of the 
Headquarters, PLA serve as overall headquar-
ters for the ground forces and as headquarters 
for the infantry in addition to performing the 
"general staff" functions for the Armed Forces 
as a whole. The headquarters of the arms and 
services were added to the original, essentially 
infantry, ground force organization as the 
other, specialized forces and support and serv-
ice elements were formed for which special 
skills and doctrines were required. The Air 
Defense Command is the joint tactical and ad-
ministrative headquarters exercising opera-
tional control over assigned ground, naval, and 
air elements comprising Communist China's 
air defense force. The other headquarters of 
the arms and services, in conjunction with the 
"general staff" departments, are responsible for 
the development of tactical doctrine and train-
ing programs for their respective arm or serv-
ice and for the administration of their person-
nel but normally exercise no operational control. 
15. CHAIN OF COMMAND 
The chain of command on operational mat-
ters normally extends from the Minister 
through the appropriate staff department of 
Headquarters, PLA to commanders of military 
regions and theaters of operations. However, 
the departments and headquarters of arms and 
services at Headquarters, PLA level also have 
separate and important administrative and 
technical chains of command to their respec-
tive counterparts in lower headquarters and 
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commands. The Director of the General Rear 
Service Department, for example, deals directly 
with the chief of the Rear Service Department 
of a military region. Similarly, the Commander 
of Artillery Headquarters deals directly with 
the Commander of Artillery of a theater or 
military region commander's staff. In addition 
to this seemingly dual chain of command is a 
third and more important channel, that of the 
Communist Party. The Party chain of com-
mand tends to offset any possible conflicts be-
tween the other two chains of command. In 
case of insoluble conflict, the region com-
mander, the staff commander, and the Party 
unit chief may appeal to their superiors at 
Headquarters, PLA. 
Section II. TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION 
16. GENERAL 
Because of its vast size, large number of 
troops, and limited transportation facilities, 
Communist China is divided geographically into 
military regions, districts, subdistricts, and gar-
rison commands. 
17. MILITARY REGIONS 
Communist China is divided into 13 military 
regions, 10 of which are named after the cities 
in which their headquarters are located and 3 
of which coincide with the major autonomous 
regions-Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang. 
The military regions and their headquarters 
are shown on the map (fig. 7). 
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The commander of a military region usually 
holds the rank of colonel general and is sub-
ordinate to the Minister of Defense through 
the Chief of the General Staff. He directly 
commands the regular military forces subordi-
nate to his region and is responsible for the 
operational control, training, and administra-
tive and logistic support of these forces. He is 
also responsible for operation of logistical in-
stallations; for administrative and logistical 
support of forces which are subordinate to 
special commands but are located within his 
region; for supervision, training, and support 
of militia units and reserves; and for certain 
phases of conscription, mobilization, and vet-
erans affairs. He also may command the air 
and naval units in his region through the re-
gional air and naval headquarters. (The or-
ganization of a military region command is 
shown in fig. 8.) 
18. MILITARY DISTRICTS 
Military regions that include two or more 
provinces are divided into military districts 
the boundaries of which coincide with the 
provincial boundaries. The military regional 
commander probably delegates responsibility 
for local administrative and logistical opera-
tions and for mobilization, conscription, re-
serve, militia, and veterans matters to the mili-
tary district commanders. 
MILITARY REGION 
COMMAND 
I I I 1 
POLITICAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEl REAR SERVICE 
DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT 
I I I 1 
MILITIA TRAINING MILITARY SERVICE GENERAL SURVEY 
BUREAU HEADQUARTERS BUREAU BUREAU 
I I I 
PUBLIC SECURITY AIR FORCES NAVAL 
FORCES HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS 
I I 1 J 
ARTILLERY ARMOR ENGINEER RAILWAY ENGINEER 
HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS 
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MILITARY REGION MILITARY DISTRICT ARMIES OTHER COMBAT SPECIAL TROOPS COMMANDS UNITS 
Figure 8. Organization of a Military Region Command. 
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19. MILITARY SUBDISTRICTS 
Military districts are subdivided into mili-
tary subdistricts the boundaries of which gen-
erally coinc;de with special administrative dis-
tricts. Responsibility for mobilization, con-
scription, reserve, militia, and veterans affairs 
and for some logistical functions probably is 
delegated to subdistrict commanders. 
20. MILITARY GARRISON COMMANDS 
Military garrison commands have been es-
tablished for the principal cities. Their mis-
sion is to defend these cities and assure the 
regime's control over these population centers. 
The garrison commander is in charge of all 
ground force units in his area. These units may 
vary in size from companies to armies. Under 
special conditions he may also command the 
Naval and Air Force units stationed in his city. 
According to the size of the city, the garrison 
command reports directly to either the military 
district or military region. 
21. THE MILITIA 
a. Traditionally, the Chinese Communists 
always have relied on the support of a local 
peasant militia. While the Communists were 
winning the mainland, the militia formed guer-
rilla forces that harassed the enemy, helped to 
consolidate the gains in newly won areas, and 
provided additional manpower for the Army. 
After gaining control of the mainland, the 
militia was used asa security force to maintain 
public peace. During the Korean War, the 
militia provided large numbers of "volunteers" 
for the Chinese Communist forces in Korea. 
However, the militia remained a poorly 
equipped, virtually untrained organization 
based upon the local civil administration. 
b. With the advent of the communes in 1958, 
the militia was greatly expanded, using as a 
nucleus the servicemen who had been demobi-
lized after completing their three years of army 
service. However, the militia is still far from 
being an effective "military" organization. Of 
the 200,000,000 that the Chinese Communists 
claim to have enrolled in the militia an esti-
mated 7,000,000 men have fired their rifles in 
practice, and 30,000,000 men have received 
rudimentary military training. It is believed 
that Communist China's military reserve forces 
have been combined with the militia. The mili-
tary laws provide for reserve service for all 
who have completed their tour of active duty. 
These ex-servicemen probably constitute the 
backbone of the militia by providing the leader-
ship and training for the expanded organiza-
tion. 
c. The peacetime role of the militia remains 
that of maintaining local security and of func-
tioning as a local police force. It also supports 
the regular forces in operational situations 
such as the one now existing near the Offshore 
Islands. In these situations, the militia pro-
vides transportation and performs guard duty. 
In time of war, the militia units in rear areas 
would increase their internal security role and 
perform rear service duties. Those near the 
front would perform patrol duties and give 
active support to combat units. The militia 
would be used as a reserve force to furnish 
replacements for the regular Armed Forces 
when necessary. 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
18 AGO lOO:2A 
CHAPTER 3. MILITARY DOCTRINE 
Section I. GENERAL 
22. THE MILITARY THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-
TUNG 
a. Chinese Communist military doctrine is 
the product of more than 30 years of develop-
ment. It is based on longstanding Chinese ideas 
of "the art of war" as modified by the concepts 
of Clausewitz and Lenin considered funda-
mental in the Soviet Union. MAO Tse-tung's 
influence has been strong at every stage of this 
development, and in the end his ideas prevailed. 
His military thought is the result of careful 
study and of trial and error under the most 
varied conditions. The works in which he has 
expressed his views are basic texts for study 
by every member of the Chinese Communist 
Armed Forces. 
b. No discussion of MAO's military thought 
can ignore the political element that permeates 
and determines its overall strategic concepts. 
The Army is, in Communist eyes, a tool of the 
Party,and the Party's objectives determine how 
the Armed Forces are to be employed. There 
are, however, certain military principles which 
can be derived from MAO's works and which, 
in various applications, will govern the combat 
operations of the Chinese Communist Army. 
These can be summarized under 12 headings: 
(1) The aim of war. War aims at destroy-
ing the effective strength of the enemy 
rather than at holding areas or cities. 
(2) Security. The conservation of the 
strength of one's own forces is es-
sential to any military operation. 
(3) Mobility. Withdraw before the en-
emy's advance; pursue the enemy's 
withdrawal; disperse or concentrate 
one's own forces swiftly on a wide and 
flexible battlefield. 
(4) Local superiority. Concentrate over-
whelming strength against the en-
emy's weaker points; accept a decisive 
engagement only with from two to six 
times the enemy's strength. 
(5) Offensive action. Attack is the vital 
method of destroying the enemy; sur-
round the enemy and attack from at 
least two directions. 
(6) Singleness of direction. Strategically, 
there must be only one main direction 
at a time; tactically, there must be a 
single objective. 
(7) Flexibility. Tactics must be ingenious 
and flexible, suited to the time, the 
place, and the situation. 
(8) Surprise. One's own forces must be 
assembled in secrecy and must attack 
at the time and place which the enemy 
least expects. 
(9) Initiative. Always seize the initiative, 
preserve one's own liberty of action, 
and force the enemy to react. 
(10) Unity of command. Unified command 
is essential to success, particularly in 
the coordination of guerrilla and reg-
ular forces. 
(11) Preparation. Combat requires meti-
culous preparation to avoid entry into 
battle without assurance of success. 
(12) Confidence. Victory is determined by 
the confidence of commanders and 
troops in the inevitable triumph of 
their cause. (This is the basis of 
MAO's statement that "imperialists 
and reactionaries are all paper tigers", 
in spite of his appreciation of the 
material shortcomings of his own 
forces; he sees all Communist forces, 
under the historical dialectic, as or-
dained to ultimate triumph, while the 
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"capitalist forces" must fall apart be-
cause of their own ideological pov-
erty.) 
c. The Chinese Communists tactics have been 
strongly influenced by years of guerrilla war-
fare, but with their present Army they will 
not necessarily continue to employ the tactics 
designed for out-numbered, poorly armed troops 
operating in the hinterlands. Their current 
doctrine envisages conventional warfare by the 
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, coordi-
nated with guerrilla warfare by units organized 
from the masses of the Chinese people. How-
ever, there would probably be no extensive em-
ployment of the "human sea" tactics which 
they were forced to use early in the Korean 
War, although the resulting casualties would 
be accepted in critical stages of a war that re-
quired utilization of relatively untrained re-
cruits. 
Section II. BASIC TACTICAL DOCTRINE 
23. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
a. The Soviet Union has had a strong in-
fluence on Chinese Communist tactical concepts. 
Nevertheless, Chinese Communist military 
leaders have emphasized that the development 
of the great armies of the West must be studied 
carefully and that no principles will be blindly 
accepted if they are not consistent with Chinese 
thought and conditions peculiar to China. 
b. The precepts advanced as "the military 
thought of MAO Tse-tung" are rigidly observed 
in both planning and in execution. They pro-
vide for deliberate, detailed prior planning, 
and swift execution when the planning is com-
Figure 9. Planning the Attack. 
plete. Modification of plans is permitted only 
within prescribed limits, thus assuring control 
of the combat action at the expense of some 
flexibility. The overall commander of a tactical 
operation develops and issues detailed tactical 
plans for combat from which little deviation 
is permitted. However, the commander himself 
may make rapid and complete changes of plan, 
still in accordance with MAO's doctrine, when 
conditions dictate. 
c. Since the Chinese Communist ground force 
is essentially an infantry army, tactics are de-
signed to exploit infantry capabilities. Sup-
porting arms are centrally controlled and plans 
for their employment are usually formulated at 
top levels. 
24. EMPLOYMENT OF COMBAT ARMS 
a. Infantry. As the basic combat arm of the 
PLA, infantry is considered capable of employ-
ment under any conditions of climate or ter-
rain and at any time. The possibility that future 
conflicts may involve nuclear warfare has not 
changed Peiping's concept of the significance 
of the infantry arm. The doctrine of mobile 
warfare and the increase of the infantry's fire-
power, mobility, and communication capabili-
ties, moreover, make the Chinese Communist 
infantry more adaptable to the requirements 
of future war. 
b. Armor. Although the quantity of armored 
equipment presently in Communist China is 
severely limited, the military leadership has 
accepted the Soviet doctrine of the mass em-
ployment of armor as the decisive arm within 
a balanced ground forces team. This accept-
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ance, however, can be little more than theore-
tical at present, since domestic production of 
tanks requires substantial augmentation by 
the Soviet Union, and since there still exists 
a critkal shortage of technically trained armor 
personnel within the PLA. Gradual expansion 
and modernization of the PLA's armored ele-
ments will, in time, allow closer adherence in 
practice to Soviet doctrine. 
c. Artillery. In the Chinese Communist com-
bined-arms team, artillery holds an important 
place. It is organic at every echelon from army 
to regiment. There are also independent artil-
lery units, the allocation of ,\"hich is the respon-
sihility of the Artillery Headquarters, PLA, but 
the employment of which is the responsibility 
of the military region or army command to 
which they have been attached. In actual opera-
tions, .combat groups of artillery units are 
formed and directly attached to the infanh'y 
units they are to support. This organization 
of the artillery combat group is the staff re-
sponsibility of the artillery officer of the head-
quarters concerned; tactical employment, how-
ever, is in the hands of the commander of the 
unit to which the artillery is attached, and fire 
control is under the designated commander of 
the combat group (fig. 11). 
25. AIR SUPPORT 
Tactical ail' support of the ground arms has 
received increased emphasis in maneuvers dur-
ing .tecent years (fig. 12). Although Chinese 
Communist close air support. elements are 
limited and probably need much additional 
Fjgure 11. Shelling the Offshore Islands, 
September 1958. 
training, their doctrine includes the engage-
ment of targets beyond the range of artillery 
and the reinforcement of artillery fires in 
crucial areas. Little information is available 
on the methods and effectiveness of air-ground 
coordination. 
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Section III. THE OFfENSE 
26. BASIC PRINCIPLES 
a. The basic military principles of the Chi-
nese Communists for offensive action stress 
purpose offensive operations 
is the destruction of the Armed Forces 
of the enemy rather than the capture 
and retention of territory; 
(2) There is complete assurance of victory 
only when a vastly superior force 
gtrikes at any given point. 
Current tactical doctrine emphasizes night 
operations and infiltration either to f.he enemy's 
flanks and rear or into positions from which to 
block the withdrawal of enemy forces. 
27.· FORMS OF OFFENSIVE ACTION 
a,. The .(;hinesc)C?n1l1lunistS()flcept of . offen-
sive action is · 1?est e~empmjed by the catch 
:phrase FOUT Fast.,-One Slow. The "One Slow" 
portion of the 
responsibility for careful evaluation, pla:nning, 
and inspection prior to the attack. The "Pour 
Fast" portion of the phrase relates to speed 
in execution of the attack: 
(1) Speed in preparation, including recon-
fmlssal1ce .. 
(2) Speed in the advance, to 
circle the enemy. 
Speed in exploitation of gains, 
vent enemy regroupjng. 
Speed in pursuit, to 
destroy a retreating enemy. 
b. The One Point-'1'wo Sides tactical tech .. 
nique is the launching of a number of separate 
attilL'ks against one objective (fig. 13). It is 
considered to be distinct from an envelopment 
in that the coordinated attacks are made by 
separate units which havedeployedpriorfo the 
beginning of the battle. 
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ADDITIONAL ATTACKS-
b. Agoinst an enemy on the move 
Figure 13. One Point-Two Sides Tactics. 
(1) One Point means to concentrate over-
whelmingly superior strength and 
attack a selected weak point. 
(2) Two Sides means that when making 
an attack, two or more efforts of at-
tacking forces are necessary, but it 
does not mean the attack is limited to 
only two sides. 
c. The isolation and subsequent detailed re-
duction of individual strong points of a defen-
sive zone are called the Divide-and-Destroy 
tactical method. It is based on the theory that 
no defensive system can be equally strong 
everywhere and that weak spots exist which, 
if captured, will permit an attack from the 
flank or rear on adjacent strong points. 
d. Strategic penetration is defined as a mas-
sive frontal attack against an enemy in a fixed 
defense line, the flanks of which are secure. 
The operation is designed to breach the defense 
at selected locations, create flanks, and permit 
passage of mobile forces deep into the enemy 
rear, to envelop and destroy him. As with the 
other forms of offensive maneuver, destruction 
of the opposing force is paramount. 
28. PHASES OF OFFENSIVE ACTION 
a. Approach March Phase and Attack Posi-
tions. The approach march of any unit begins 
COMBAT CONTINUATION 
IN OF THE 
DEPTH ATTACK 
+ -- ----~ 
ASSA:JLT ( ::;~ ':, - - - i- - ~ 
I ~ ____ ~~ ---rFIRE FIGHT!i 
-r~ 
I 
ATTACK DEPLOYMENT t --®+ 
APPROACH 
MARCH 
CHINESE UNITED STATES 
APPROACH 
MARCH 
Figure 14. Comparison of Chinese Communist and 
U. S. Army Phases of Offensive Action. 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
24 AGO l0012A 
when it deploys from the next higher echelon 
to which it is assigned or attached. The ap-
proach march ends when the unit occupies its 
attack position, or when it deploys its subordi-
nate units under enemy fire, as in a meeting 
€ngagement. The attack position of a unit is 
defined by the Chinese Communists as that 
location where the commander issues the attack 
{)rder to his subordinate units and designates 
their attack or assault positions. Attack posi-
tions are utilized only by regiments and smaller 
units; divisions and larger forces accomplish 
their deployment in successive assembly areas. 
Regimental, battalion, and, in some cases, com-
pany attack positions in a Chinese offensive are 
intermediate areas used for successive deploy-
ment of subordinate echelons between assembly 
areas and assault positions. 
b. Attack Phase and Assault Positions. In 
Chinese Communist doctrine, the attack phase 
begins with the departure from company attack 
positions and ends with the occupation of com-
pany assault positions. It is normally employed 
only when it is necessary to fight to reach the 
assault position. Although the attack phase is 
planned in detail, it is dispensed with when as-
sault companies can make an unobserved ap-
proach march (under cover of terrain features, 
darkness, fog, or smoke) directly from the bat-
talion attack position to assault positions. As-
sault positions are areas in which companies 
or platoons receive final instructions, deploY, 
and prepare to launch the assault on the objec-
tive. Assault positions are located as close as 
possible to the objective and are disposed to 
facilitate the assault from several directions 
simultaneously, the main effort being pointed, 
if possible, at the flanks or rear of the hostile 
position. 
c. Assault Phase. The assault phase begins 
when units move out in the assault and ends 
when the initial objective has been overrun and 
consolidated. 
d. Combat-in-Depth Phase. The Chinese Com-
munist combat-in-depth phase commences with 
the continuation of the attack from the initial 
objective and includes all subsequent action by 
fire and maneuver to seize intermediate and 
final objectives or to force the enemy to re-
treat so a pursuit can be initiated. 
e. Pursuit. The Chinese consider pursuit 
second only to destruction in place as a means 
of annihilating the enemy. Intermediate and 
final objectives for the combat-in-depth phase 
are selected to facilitate the initiation of the 
pursuit; if hostile forces become disorganized 
and commence their retreat prior to the seizure 
of final objectives, subordinate commanders are 
directed to commence the pursuit immediately, 
without completing the combat-in-depth phase. 
29. MISSIONS 
a. Tactical missions are assigned by combat 
orders which frequently give detailed instruc-
tions to commanders several echelons below the 
issuing headquarters. For example, it is com-
mon practice for army combat orders to assign 
missions directly to specified infantry regi-
ments. Tactical orders assign both immediate 
and subsequent missions to subordinate com-
manders, a practice adopted at the expense of 
flexibility, to improve control over subordinate 
units despite limited communications. 
b. The immediate mission of the division in 
the army attack echelon is to break through 
the enemy main battle position and destroy 
regimental reserves and artillery positions. 
Initial division objectives are two to two and 
a half miles behind the enemy main line of 
resistance, and their seizure assists in destruc-
tion of hostile forces in the enemy main battle 
position. The subsequent mission normally re-
quires the attack division to develop the break-
through into the depth of the enemy main de-
fense zone, in coordination with forces in the 
army support and reserve echelons. Seizure of 
final division objectives-some six to nine miles 
deep-should result in destruction of enemy 
division reserves and heavy artillery, and oc-
cupation of terrain from which to support or 
participate in an attack on the enemy's second 
defense zone. 
c. The immediate mission of the division in 
the army support echelon is to support the 
breakthrough of the enemy main battle posi-
tion by fire and maneuver, or to complete it if 
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necessary. The subsequent mission usually re-
quires the support division to spearhead the 
attack through the depth of the hostile main 
defense zone. 
d. In the army attack plan, the army reserve 
commander is assigned only a general mission 
which requires him to follow behind the attack 
and support echelons, prepared to counter a 
hostile threat or exploit success upon order. 
e. The division commander assigns immediate 
and subsequent missions to his subordinate 
units-down to and including infantry bat-
talions-indicating the tasks to be accomplished 
by each. The immediate mission of an assault 
unit in a Divide-and-Destroy maneuver is nor-
mally the capture of an objective in the forward 
enemy positions. For as assault unit in an 
envelopment or One Point-Two Sides action, 
the mission is usually the seizure of an objec-
tive that will prevent withdrawal or reinforce-
ment of the enveloped hostile force. The sub-
sequent mission in a penetration may be the 
seizure of an objective that widens or deepens 
the gap affected by action in accomplishing the 
immediate mission, a flanking sweep to isolate 
certain hostile elements, or a penetration in a 
new direction to help divide into smaller seg-
ments a hostile element already isolated by 
previous action. In an envelopment, the subse-
quent mission may be the seizure of an objec-
tive that facilitates division of hostile forces 
already isolated, an attack in a new direction 
to help isolate additional enemy elements, or 
the initiation of a pursuit. A unit's subsequent 
mission is normally designed to facilitate the 
accomplishment of the immediate mission of 
the next higher echelon. 
Section IV. THE DEFENSE 
30. BASIC PRINCIPLES 
a. The defensive is assumed in the face of a 
superior hostile force to permit concentration 
and employment of troops in a more decisive 
sector or to lure the enemy into an area that 
will facilitate offensive operations against him. 
The defensive may also be assumed to await 
a more favorable opportunity for launching 
a general offensive. 
b. Chinese Communist defensive strategy 
stresses mobile warfare based on localized tac-
tical offensive by subordinate echelons of the 
force assigned the defensive mission. 
c. Where applicable, the Chinese Communist 
concept of defense includes such measures as 
trading space for time; complete abandonment, 
frequently in conjunction with a scorched-earth 
policy, of areas of little importance; concentra-
tion of defensive strength in critical areas; con-
duct of extensive guerrilla activities in hostile 
rear areas; and emphasis on psychological war-
fare to strengthen popular support at home and 
in rear areas or to promote dissent and unrest 
among the troops and civilian population of the 
enemy. 
31. TYPES OF DEFENSE 
a. The Chinese Communists employ both 
mobile defense and position defense, but favor 
the mobile defense since it is best suited to their 
concept of mobile warfare. 
b. Mobile defense tactics are employed when 
there is sufficient space to trade for time, mean-
while preserving their own forces and inflicting 
substantial losses on the enemy. Mobile defense 
tactics are frequently employed to lure an ex-
tended hostile force into an engagement where 
it can be annihilated by overwhelmingly su-
perior forces waiting in ambush. 
c. Position defense is employed only when 
absolutely necessary to deny a vital area to the 
enemy. The concept is one of firm resistance 
without retreat from a continuous defensive 
perimeter; it does not include delaying action 
on successive positions. In extreme cases, when 
a prepared position has been overrun by the 
enemy, the defending forces will fall back into 
bunkers, call artillery fire and tactical air sup-
port onto their own position, and wait to join 
with counterattacking forces to drive off the 
enemy. 
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d. When the frontage assigned a unit exceeds 
the capability of the unit to organize a continu~ 
ous position defense, the commander assumes a 
defense on a wide front. The organization of 
the sector assigned, however, is based on hold~ . 
ing critical terrain features that control ad-
jacent ground rather than on establishing a 
continuous defensive perimeter. Again there is 
no idea of falling back to successive positions. 
e. Defense against CBR attack includes warn-
ing, countermeasures to break up the enemy 
attack, local activities to protect troops against 
the effects of CBR agents, and activities to 
eliminate the effects of contamination subse~ 
quent to the attack. Recent Chinese Communist 
training maneuvers have emphasized training 
in CBR defense. 
32. ORGANIZATION FOR DEFENSE 
a. Army and higher echelons organize their 
defense from front to rear into three basic zones 
-the advance zone, the main defense zone, and 
the second defense zone (fig. 15). The advance 
zone includes security forces and the combat 
security positions; the main defense zone in-
cludes the main and second battle positions; and 
the second defense zone is organized and oc-
cupied by those troops of the overall commander 
not otherwise committed. Additional or alter-
nate defense zones farther to the rear are pre-
pared as time and the situation permit. 
b. Division and smaller units organize for 
defense by establishing security positions, main 
defense positions, and positions in depth. A 
unit's main defense position and position in 
depth together comprise the next higher unit's 
main defense position (zone). The forward 
edges of all main defense positions (division and 
below) and zones (army and above) are coinci-
dent and delimit the forward edge of the overall 
commander's main battle position. 
33. ORGANIZATION OF THE GROUND 
a. As soon as troops arrive in the areas they 
are to defend, they immediately begin to or-
ganize the ground. Organization continues so 
long as the position is occupied, except during 
periods of actual combat. Among the first pri-
ority construction tasks assigned in the defense 
zone are-
(1) Construction of anti'tank and antiper-
sonnel mine fields and obstacles and 
field fortifications in front of the main 
defense zone. 
(2) Clearing of fields of observation and 
fire. 
(3) Construction of field fortifications, 
antitank defenses, and connecting 
trenches in the battalion defense area 
in the main defense position. 
(4) Construction of field fortifications, 
antitank defenses, and connecting 
trenches in the remainder of the de~ 
fense zone. 
(5) Construction of artillery-firing and 
tank positions. 
( 6) Camouflage and concealment. 
b. Fortifications are to be properly located 
to meet tactical requirements and constructed 
in depth to permit mutual support and maneuver 
of troops. In addition they are unusually strong, 
well concealed, appropriate in size, and have a 
low silhouette. The importance of field fortifi-
cations in executing defensive operations, pre~ 
serving lives, and protecting supplies and 
equipment is stressed by Chinese Communist 
commanders. 
c. Wherever possible, defensive positions are 
established on terrain that itself constitutes an 
obstacle. Additionally, natural obstacles are 
improved and artificial obstacles installed, in-
cluding minefields and antitank ditches. 
d. Emphasis is placed on camouflage during 
preparation for and conduct of the defense. 
Units disposed within the main defense position 
especially are required to conceal their positions 
and troop activities. Commanders at all levels 
use field expedients and locally available mate-
rials to camouflage trenches, bunkers, and in-
dividuals. Deceptive camouflage activities are 
continued even after positions are evacuated. 
34. RETROGRADE MOVEMENTS 
a. The overall aim of retrograde movements 
is to facilitate the initiation or resumption of 
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Figure 15. Simplified Diagram of a Defense Zone on a Normal Front. 
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is increased by the issue of additional automatic 
weapons, light mortars, and grenades. The 
operation may last from a few hours to se~eral 
days. Reconnaissance personnel, specIally 
trained for such operations, reportedly often 
infiltrate in civilian clothes. Airborne units are 
trained to perform such missions, usually in 
platoon or company strength, after being 
dropped int.o the enemy rear. 
37. AIRBORNE 
Airborne operations probably will follow the 
Soviet doctrine which envisages raid-type mis-
sions, in strength from platoon to division, 
rather than massive coordinated airborne as-
saults. Such operations are planned either as 
the brief reconnaissance harassing actions dis-
cussed above, or as part of a quick link-up plan 
in coordination with conventional ground 
forces. 
Figure 17. An Airborne Reconnaissance Team 
in the Enemy's Rear. 
38. AMPHIBIOUS 
Amphibious training in the Chinese Com-
munist Army has received increasing emphasis 
since the well-planned and -executed attack 
against Nationalist-held I-chiang in January 
1955. Equipment and techniques have been 
steadily modernized. While any large-scale 
amphibious operation will rely heavily on the 
use of motorized junks and sampans, Soviet-
type landing craft playa large part in current 
training and are available for actual operations. 
The Chinese Communists have practiced 
putting tanks and heavy artillery ashore in 
addition to the infantry (fig. 18). The I-chiang 
operation and subsequent landing exercises have 
included close coordination with naval and air 
elements. 
39. JUNGLE WARFARE 
The Chinese Communist ground forces have 
acquired considerable experience in jungle war-
fare tactics through operations in Burma and 
along the southern border of China during 
World War II, through participation by in-
structor-observer groups with Viet Minh troops 
in the Indochina War, and through border de-
fense operations since 1950. Methods used by 
the Chinese Communist Army for jungle war-
fare probably would include the employment of 
streamlined infantry divisions (without armor 
and heavier artillery) ; extensive use of infiltra-
tion, ambush, and guerrilla tactics in which any 
single engagement would involve only small 
units ; and close coordination with civilians or 
Figure 18. Armored Amphibious landing. 
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Figure 20. Ski Troops on Winter Maneuvers. 
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actions within the borders of Communist China. 
In Southeast Asia, the terrain, the political 
situation, and the logistics - communications 
problems would require almost exclusive reli-
ance on guerrilla tactics. Weapons would be no 
heavier than those which can be carried by 
their crews with a minimum of animal trans-
port; the units committed probably would be 
battalion-size or smaller. Control at the stra-
tegic level, however, would coordinate every 
aspect of such a campaign. In physical stamina, 
organization, equipment, and leadership, the 
Chinese Communist Army is eminently suited 
for this type of warfare. 
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CHAPTER 4. ORGANIZATION OF THE FIELD FORCES 
Section I. DEVElOPMENT AND TRENDS 
44. PAST REORGANIZATIONS 
Four successive reorganizations have estab-
lished the Chinese Communist Army in its pres-
ent form. In 1949 the primarily guerrilla forces 
were in a gradual process of transition toward 
more conventional organization. Beginning 
early in 1951, a sweeping reorganization 
adapted these armies for participation in the 
Korean War. In 1953, with the Korean cease-
fire, further modifications took place. Finally, 
in June 1955, as a result of the combat experi-
ences of the previous few years and the receipt 
of increased quantities of modern materiel from 
the Soviet Union, a formal reorganization was 
undertaken which has not yet been completed, 
but which will probably set the standard for the 
foreseeable future (fig. 21). 
45. PRESENT STATUS AND TRENDS 
a. Notwithstanding efforts to standardize, 
there is still considerable variance within units. 
The materiel being provided by the U.S.S.R. 
and produced in China is insufficient to equip 
all units according to a standard TOE, and quan-
tities of nonstandard items captured from the 
Nationalist Chinese forces, from the Japanese, 
or from the United Nations forces in Korea are 
still in use. Although a standard TOE has been 
adopted, commanders are given considerable 
flexibility in the organization of their forces to 
meet special tactical situations or terrain and 
weather conditions. 
b. The two highest tactical and administra-
tive echelons in wartime and the theater of 
operations, or equivalent, and the field army or 
army group-consisting of several armies each. 
These organizations are currently nonexist-
ent, but they, or their equivalents, would 
probably be reconstituted in the event of a pro-
longed, major operational situation. 
c. The trend of the latest reorganization was 
toward a general adaptation of Soviet models to 
the Chinese situation. Staff and overhead per-
sonnel have been reduced, and service and sup-
Figure 21. The Modern Chinese Communist Army-Infantry-Armor Attack. 
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port elements have been strengthened. In-
creased firepower and the addition of engineer, 
chemical warfare, antiaircraft, and motor 
transport components have considerably im-
proved operational flexibility and combat effec-
tiveness. 
Section II. ARMS AND SERVICES 
46. INFANTRY 
Infantry still constitutes the overwhelming 
bulk of the Chinese Communist Army, though 
supporting arms and services are steadily in-
creasing. The infantry arm has no separate 
headquarters at PLA level; as the essential ele-
ment of the ground forces it is controlled di-
rectly by the staff departments of PLA Head-
quarters rather than through a separate head-
quarters at PLA level as are some of the other 
arms and services. Each Chinese Communist 
army (fig. 22) is composed of three infantry 
divisions, each comprised of three infantry 
regiments, a tank-assault gun regiment, and an 
artillery regiment, plus headquarters and sup-
port elements (fig. 23). 
47. ARMOR 
Armored forces in the Chinese Communist 
Army include tank and assault-gun units plus 
those involved in the maintenance and support 
work normally handled by ordnance personnel 
in the United States Army. Armored elements 
of the CCA include armored divisions (fig. 24), 
separate tank regiments, and the tank-assault-
gun regiment organic to the infantry division. 
At the PLA level, Armor Headquarters is re-
sponsible for the purely branch aspects of 
administration, logistics, and training. 
ARMY Strength 56,400 
HEADQUARTERS 
AND 1,900 
STAFF 
1500 1400 17,600 1500 
RECONNAI SSANCE GUARD INFANTRY ENGINEER 
BAITALION BAITALION DIVISION BAITALION 
NOTES: I. Strengths are those of units under full wartime TOE rounded 
off, not those of actual units at present. 
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2. There may be an organic smoke and flame-thrower battalion 
at army level. 
3. Artillery is normally allocated to the army for further allocation 
to lower echelons as required. 
Figure 22. Chinese Communist Army. 
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Fieure 23. Chinese Communist Infantry Division. 
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Figure 24. Chinese Communist Armored Division. 
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48. ARTILLERY 
a. General. The term artillery, as used by 
the Cpinese Communists, includes conventional 
field artillery weapons, mortars, multiple rocket 
launcl'lers, and recoilless rifles (fig. 25). Organ-
izatioilally, some of this equipment is found in 
infantry units as well as in field, antitank, and 
antiaiTcraft artillery units. Field and antitank 
artillery, other than that organic to line units, 
is allocated to subordinate echelons by the Artil-
lery Headquarters at the PLA level. The three 
types of artillery are organized as indicated 
below, 
Figure 25. 152-mm Howitzers. 
b. Field Artillery. There are two types of 
field artillery divisions in the CCA: One, the 
Howitzer Division (fig. 26 (2» is the Chinese 
parallel to the Soviet Breakthrough Division; 
t~e . other, the Gun Division (fig. 26 (1) ), is 
SImIlar to the Soviet Gun Division. There are 
also field artillery regiments organic to infantry 
and armored divisions-and perhaps to army-
and artillery (heavy weapons) battalions or-
ganic to public security divisions and infantry 
regiments. Truck-mounted multiple rocket 
launchers are organized, according to TOE, into 
one regiment in each Howitzer Division; rocket 
launcher divisions, observed in Korea, may still 
exist. Self-propelled artillery units are consid-
ered by the Chinese Communists to be armor. 
c. Antitank Artillery. Antitank artillery is 
organized in independent divisions (fig. 27), in 
battalions organic to the infantry division, and 
in companies organic to the heavy weapons 
battalion of the infantry regiment. 
d. Antiaircraft Artillery. Antiaircraft artil-
lery organization provides for divisions with a 
flexible organization (fig. 28) and for separate 
regiments. Some of the units are composed of 
Army personnel, some of Air Force, and some 
of Navy; the Air Defense Headquarters at PLA 
level exercises over-all control and coordination. 
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( 3 Bns of 12 guns each) ( 3 Bns of 12 guns each) 
(2) 
ARTilLERY 
DIVISION 6, 700 
( Howitzer) 
HEADQUARTERS 480 AND STAFF 
1130 140 1140 1430 
COMMAND GUARD CHEMICAL ANTIAIRCRAFT WARFARE ARTILLERY COMPANY PLATOON COMPANY BATTALION 
1500 1500 980 
1 40 
GUARD 
PLATOON 
1 
i HEAVY MORTAR I 
I REGIMENT 
1140 
CHEMICAL 
WARFARE 
COMPANY 
., 
I 
I 
t L. ______ ... _ _ J 
( Unconfirmed) 
122-mm. 152-mm. ROCKET NOTE: Strengths are those of full 
HOWITZER HOWITZER LAUNCHER wartime TOE, rounded off. 
REGIMENT REGIMENT REGIMENT 
~ 3 Bns of 12 guns each) ( 3 Bns of 12 guns each) (2 Bns of 12xl32-mm RL each) 
(1) Gun (2) Howitzer 
Figure 26. Chinese Communist Artillery Division. 
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ANTITANK 4,200 DIVISION 
370 
HEADQUARTERS 
AND 
STAFF 
140 190 890 
COMMAND ANTITANK ~ GUARD 
PLATOON COMPANY REGIMENT I (probable 
I 4 regiments) 
... __ ~~ ____ :J 
190 190 190 140 
COMMAND AAMG HEADQUARTERS GUARD AND COMPANY BATTERY STAFF PLATOON 
90 
ANTITANK 
BATTERY 
NOTES: Strengths shown are those of full wartime TOE, rounded off. 
40 
2 24 antitank guns per regiment; one regiment of 57-mm. guns, 
one of 85-mm. guns, one of IOO-mm. guns and one of 57-mm. 
and 76-mm. guns mixed. 
Figure 27. Chinese Communist Antitank Artillery Division. 
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CHEMICAL 
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ANTI A I RCRAFT 
ARTILLERY 3,100 - 4,700 
DIVI S ION 
HEADQUARTERS 
AND 380 
STAFF 
• 
BOO 1 1800 1800 
AAA 
REGIMENT 
(MEDIUM) 
AAA 
REGIMENT 
(MED OR LIGHT) 
AAA 
REGIMENT 
(LIGHT) 
100 
HEADQUARTERS 
AND 
STAFF 
100 
OOMMAND ......... 
COMPANY 
80 
AAMG 
BATTERY 
no 
AAA 
BATTERY 
40 
GUARD 
PLATOON 
CHEMICAL 
WARFARE 
PLATOON 
( ea 4x851100-mm.guns ) 
100 
HEADQUARTERS 
AND 
STAFF 
90 
COMMAND ......... 
BATfERY 
80 
AAMG 
BATTERY 
90 
AAAW 
BATTERY 
40 
GUARD 
PLATOON 
40 
CHEMICAL 
PLATOON 
( ea 4x37157-mm.guns ) 
Figure 28. Chinese Communist Antiaircraft Artillery Division. 
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I- COMMAND 
COMPANY 
140 
CHEMICAL 
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COMPANY 
40 
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CAVALRY Personnel 5000 ? DIVISION 
• • • • • • 
HEADQUARTERS POLITICAL SIGNAL CAVALRY 'SECURITY RECONNAI SSANCE REAR SERVICE 
AND STAFF DEPARTMENT PLATOON REGIMENT COMPANY PLATOON DEPARTMENT 
I • • • • • 
HEADQUARTERS POLITICAl SIGNAL CAVALRY SECURITY RECONNAI SSANCE REAR SERVICE 
AND STAFF SECTION PLATOON BAlTALION PLATOON PLATOON DEPARTMENT 
• • • • • 
HEADQUARTERS POlITICAl SIGNAL CAVALRY SECURITY REAR SERVICE 
AND STAFF SECTION SQUAD COMPANY PLATOON DEPARTMENT 
• 
• I CAVALRY MORTAR 
PLATOON PLATOON 
I 
CAVALRY MORTAR 
SQUAD SQUAD 
Figure 29. Chinese Communist Cavalry Division. 42 
CAVALRY 
are a few cavalry units in the CCA, 
primarily for employment in the 
terrain most common in western and 
China. They are organized in 
(fig. 29) and possibly.in independent 
They are prinlal'ily a mounted Hght 
foree, with excellent reconnalsHance 
A!R80RNE 
CCAhas airborne troops organized in 
They are equipped along Soviet lines 
30) aIHl use the Soviet doctrine for small-
employment followed by :rapid link~up 
with conventional. g:roundforces. In addition to 
in airborne units, Communist China has 
number of partially qualified para-
trained through the civil and military 
programs. 
Figure 30. Chinese Communist Airborne Troops. 
51. PU8l1C SECURITY FORCES 
'l'hepublic security forces of the PLA are 
UH'LH~L« from the civil public security agencies 
are under the Ministry of .Public Secu~ 
They are organized in. divisions and regi~ 
(fig, 31). classified according to mission 
as Border Defense or Internal Security units, 
According to the Chinese Communists, they are 
"an armed political enforcement agency and a 
further armed force in time of war", In organ-
ization they are similar to regular infantry divi-
and regiments, but their al'mttment is 
lighter and less standardized. They are not con-
sidered capable of independent, sustained, fun..: 
combat operations. 
52. ENGINEERS 
/1., ThQre are two IJrincipal types of engineer 
units in the eCA. One type, eonsidel~d by 
.Peiping to be combat units, consists or the engi~ 
neer regiments employed at army level, the 
engiMc!' battalions organic to army and in-
fantry divisions, and the compa.nies 
organic to other combat units. The missions 
these units include the preparation of fortifica-
tions, laying and removing obstacles, 
demolition work, bridgingt and highway main~ 
tenance in the combat zone, Railway engineer 
divisions may be included within this type, since 
their wartime mission requires them to keep 
rail lines open throughout the combat zone; 
their peacetime work is principaIly t11e< repair, 
improvement, and expansion the rail com-
nmnications net on the Chinese mainland. 
b. The second type of engineer unit a quasi-
military rather than a combat unit. It includes 
construction engineer divisiousand agricultural 
divisions, and it has the mission of contributing 
to the national economy more than to the opera-
tions of the Armed Forces. rfhey are composed 
largely of drafted civilian labor anddemobiHzed 
servicemen, although they a!'e under . .PLA con-
troland are organized along military lines. 
53, SIGNAL 
The Chinese Communists regard the PLA 
signal units as combat elemellta.Theycornprise 
the independent regiments that are usually em..; 
ployed at the army level, the battalions organic 
to armies· and infantry divisions, and the com~ 
panies organic to other combat units. In addi-: 
tion to the normal military functions of signal 
units, they make substantial t;ontdbutions to 
the civilcommunic:ations network in China. 
54. MOTOR TRANSPORT 
CCA units have considerably less organic 
motor transport than have companibleUldi;ed 
States Army units. It is orgariizedintot~ 
transportation battalions ofth~ . and 
divisions, and into independent motor tran~port. 
regiments (fig. 32), The latter augment th~ 
former in meeting army and division t.ranspo~~ 
tation requirements and provide thejrallspol';' 
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SIGNAL 
COMPANY 
1100 
RECON. AND 
SIGNAL 
COMPANY 
GUARD 
COMPANY 
1120 
GUARD 
COMPANY 
Iso 
HMG 
COMPANY 
(9xHMG) 
PUBLIC 
SECURITY 8,200 
DIVI SION 
HEADQUARTERS 
AND 230 
STAFF 
2,350 
PUBLIC 
SECURITY 
REGIMENT 
140 
HEADQUARTERS 
AND 
STAFF 
610 
PUBLIC 
SECURITY 
BATTALION 
40 
HEADQUARTERS 
AND 
STAFF 
100 
PUBLIC 
SECURITY 
COMPANY 
1500 
ARTILLERY 
BATTALION 
1160 
ARTILLERY 
BATTERY 
, 4x76-mm. gun) 
190 
MORTAR 
COMPANY 
(9x82-mm. mortar) 
Figure 31. Chinese Communist Public Security Division. 
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MOTOR TRANS PORT 1750 
REGIMENT 
HEADQUARTERS 
AND 40 
STAFF 
I 
1130 -150 I 470 160 
MOTOR DRIVER MA I NTENANCE GUARD TRANSPORT TRAINING COMPANY PLATOON BATTALION COMPANY 
20 
HEADQUARTERS 
AND 
STAFF 
110 110 140 I 10 
MAl NTENANCE MOTOR SIGNAL SERVICE TRANSPORT SQUAD SQUAD SQUAD COMPANY 
(46xTrk, 4x2/6x6) 
Regiment: Battalion: 5xTrk, 114 Ton 
14OxTrk, 4x2/6x6 
4xTrk, VVrecker 
AGO l0012A 
20xTrk, 1/4 Ton 
525xTrk, 4x2/6x6 
14xTrk, VVrecker 
Figure 32. Chinese Communist Motor Transport Regiment. 
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tation support for the many units still lacking 
organic motor transport. The military motor 
transport units are also used in meeting the 
transportation requirements of the national 
economy. 
55. CHEMICAL WARFARE 
Chemical warfare units in the CCA are or-
ganic to other tactical units, and the Chinese 
Communists regard them as combat elements. 
A chemical warfare company is organic to the 
division, and a chemical warfare platoon is or-
ganic to the regiment. Their missions are pri-
marily CBR reconnaissance and decontamina-
tion, but they also operate flamethrowers and 
smoke-generating equipment, and presumably 
are responsible for handling local storage and 
distribution of toxic materials~ 
56. MEDICAL 
Medical units are organized under the rear 
service departments of the army, division, and 
regiment. The army has a battalion-size medi-
cal section capable of operating from two to 
five mobile field hospitals. There is a medical 
battalion at division level and a medical com-
pany at regimental level. Medical troops also 
staff the military hospitals throughout China, 
probably with considerable civilian augmenta-
tion. 
Section III. COMMAND AND STAFF 
57. GENERAL 
Inasmuch as the armed forces are an instru-
ment of the Chinese Communist Party, com-
mand and staff responsibilities in the CCA are 
exercised through two parallel chains - one 
military, the other political (fig. 33). Coordi-
nation is achieved informally by the personal 
relationships of individual commanders with 
their political counterparts, and formally by the 
operation of the Party Committees at the vari-
ous levels, insuring Party control throughout. 
58. THE MILITARY STAFF 
Military staffs in the CCA operate down 
through the battalion level. Their functions 
are much the same as those of similar staffs in 
Western Armies except that some phases of in-
telligence work are the responsibility of the 
political staffs and administration is considered 
to be on a level somewhat below operations, 
training, and logistics. 
59. THE POLITICAL STAFF 
A political department, in a direct chain of 
command under the General Political Depart-
ment at PLA Headquarters, is organic to every 
headquarters down through regiment. There 
are political commissars and their assistants as 
counterparts of the commanders and deputy 
commanders at every echelon from army down 
through regiment, and political officers and 
their assistants as counterparts of the com-
manders and assistant commanders at battalion 
and company level. The CCA is thus threaded 
through with a political organization charged 
with the indoctrination and "cultural" educa-
tion of all personnel; with surveillance: with 
some security, intelligence, and counterintelli-
gence functions; and with supervision of the 
Party's interests in personnel matters relating 
to assignments, promotions, disciplinary action, 
awards, and reenlistment. 
60. POLITICO-MILITARY RElA TlONSH IPS 
Party control is considered as essential in the 
Armed Forces as it is in the national govern-
ment. Such control is attained by giving im-
portant assignments to Party members, and by 
the political system which parallels the military 
chain of command and in which the political 
officers and military commanders share com-
mand responsibility. The commissar and politi-
cal officer are expected to be fully qualified mili-
tarily as well as soundly indoctrinated in ideo-
logical background. Differences in viewpoint 
between commanders and their political coun-
terparts are known to have arisen, particularly 
over such matters as military versus political 
training or the exercise of command during 
maneuvers. In such instances the political de-
partment usually dominates. At each level in 
the Armed Forces-of which the commander is 
a member-the Party Committee is the ulti-
mate organ of policy. 
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INFANTRY Commander 
DIVISION Deputy Commander 
COMMAND Political Commissar 
GROUP Deputy Political Commissar 
I 
I I I 
OPERATIONS 80 REAR SERVICE no POLITICAL 75 DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT 
I I 
I 
OPERATIONS TRAINING ADMINISTRATIVE RATIONS CLOTHING & ORGANIZATION YOUTH CULTURE 
SECTION I- SECTION SECTION SECTION ~ EQUIPMENT SECTION I- SECTION SECTION SECTION 
I NTELLI GENCE CLASSIFIED RECONNAISSANCE ORDNANCE SERVICE SECURITY & CIVIL CLUB DOCUMENT ~ MILITARY LAW -I- AFFAIRS ATHLETIC SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTION SUB- TEAM SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTION 
ENGINEER ARMOR ARTILLERY FUEL TRANSPORT PROPAGANDA ENEMY PHOTO MOVIE ~ & EDUCATION ~. AFFAIRS SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTI ON SECTION SECTION TEAM TEAM 
I 
CHEMICAL SIGNAL SUPPLY FINANCE ENEMY LIBRARY DRAMA 
SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTION PROPAGANDA TEAM TEAM SUBSECTION 
MILITARY PROVOST ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICAL AFFAIRS .. 
SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTION 
MEDICAL 
BATTALION 
\ n: I 
• t 
MILITARY STAFF POLITICAL STAFF 
Figure 33. Double Staff Organization, Chinese Communist Infantry Division. 
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Section IV. EVALUA nON 
6l. IMPORTANCE OF PRESENT STANDARDI-
ZATION 
The Chinese Communist Army has improved 
significantly since facing the United Nations 
Forces in Korea. It is better equipped, better 
organized, and better trained. The new organi-
zation has been the single most important fac-
tor in improving combat effectiveness of the 
CCA by providing for the efficient use of in-
creased quantities of materiel and by facilitat-
ing standardization of intensified training 
throughout the Armed Forces. 
62. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
The total strength of Communist China's 
Armed Forces probably will remain relatively 
stable for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, 
continuation of the reorganization and modern-
ization processes may result in further modifi-
cations within the PLA. As sufficient armor 
becomes available all infantry divisions may 
have the tank-assault gun regiment, and addi-
tional armored divisions may be organized. 
With the availability of more transport air-
craft, some infantry divisions may be converted 
into airborne divisions. Increases in amphibi-
ous transport capabilities may lead to the for-
mation of an amphibious command. Such de-
velopments, however, probably will be effected 
within the flexible framework already estab-
lished by the military reorganization of 1955. 
I 
, 
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CHAPTER 5. PERSONNEL AND TRAINING 
Section I. THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER 
ac-
,,,.,'HV,,"'" to htlrdsllip,'l com~ 
practic.ally and 
in matters not directly affecting 
or 111S village. His Obi?:d.1ii?:Uc:e 
by or by intense PCl'-
to hIs commander; profession 
with contempt by the general 
V!~'i.}tU"h'~. The Communist regime has attempted 
situation and has been latgely 
PRE-SERVICE BACKGROUND 
fl. Chinese Oommunist conscripts are, 
drawn from the peasants who 
some 80 percent of China's po pula-
physical condition is usnally ex-
are better educated than were the 
the pre .. Communist period, and fill 
Figure 34. The Chinese Communist Soldier. 
to enable 
publications, Con-
and Party 
recruit's home village 
the value of mem heiship in 
in the Party. have accustomed 
patterns of Party control. Theoretically, 
to the Party has supp1anted loyalty to indi'lfidual 
commanders (fig. 35). Standards of tBctmical 
baekground are being improved graduaUY, 
the lack of technically profic.ient eonscripts will 
continue to be a major handicap for the Cllillese 
Communist fOl'{!eS some time. Finally, a 
determined campaign to enhance the prestige 
and social standing of mUital'y service as a 
Whole bas largely over(~ome traditiona-l con-
tempt for the soldier. 
65. CHARACTERISTICS 
a. In the service, the individual soldier is 
integrated into a politico-military system which 
leaves little time of oWn and virtually 110 
privacy. Every minub" of his day spent under 
the supervision either of mnitary superwrs or 
of political personnel Under basic policy' 
ilying the ascendancy political guida1!e~ over 
the military, he is subjected to a perva,si\1e and 
continuous indoctrination designed to 
every aspect of his thought and .<:tCtAVll1' 
efficacy of this indoctrination on peri>onn@l 
are both naive and possessed of strong cnlrruIlon 
sense is difficult to assess; there is, 
evidence any overt discontent 
lower ranks of the Armed Forces. 
b. The Chinese Communist soldi~:r iahard 
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Figure 35. Welcoming Recruits to an Infantry Unit. 
and willing worker, able to improvise under a 
wide variety of conditions. Strong appeals are 
made to his national pride and Party loyalty. 
Fear of ideological criticism presumably serves 
as further motivation. In literacy and technical 
proficiency he still falls below Western stand-
ards; however, in physical condition and ability 
to bear hardships he is probably superior to the 
average Western soldier. Properly trained and 
led, he makes an outstanding fighting man. 
Section II. RANK AND PAY STRUCTURE 
66. RANK 
a. Until 1955, the Chinese Communist Armed 
Forces had no system of personal rank. Instead, 
positional rank was used to designate an in-
dividual's position within the Army. Personnel 
holding positions from assistant platoon leader 
up were considered officers and those occupy-
ing positions of squad leader and assistant 
squad leader, or their equivalents, were con-
sidered noncommissioned officers. Two regula-
tions passed in 1955 formally established an 
officer corps and introduced noncommissioned 
officer grades in the service. 
b. The laws established four classes of com-
missioned officers: 
(1) Marshal (two grades) ; 
(2) general (four grades) ; 
(3) field (four grades) ; and 
(4) company (four grades). 
There since has been established a rank of war-
rant officer, which is the equivalent of sub-
lieutenant and is believed to be used in com-
mand positions rather than in administrative 
positions. The three grades of noncommissioned 
officers are senior sergeant, sergeant, and cor-
poral. There are three grades below corporal-
private first class, private second class, and 
recruit. 
c. The rank of Senior Marshal, which as yet 
has not been conferred, is reserved for those 
who distinguished themselves in the civil war 
against the Nationalists. The rank of Marshal, 
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so far conferred only on 10 of the top military 
leaders, also appears to be an honor given for 
past revolutionary services. All other officers 
fall into one of eight categories: Command 
politi~al, t~chnical, quartermaster, medical: 
vetermary, Judge advocate, and administrative. 
Command and political officers are those hold-
ing' posit~ons in i~fantry, armor, cavalry, artil-
lery, engmeer, rallway, signal, technical service 
public security, air defense, air and naval units: 
67. PAY 
a. By Western standards, military pay is low, 
but service personnel enjoy a higher standard 
of living than the average civilian in Commu-
nist China. Compensation for the recruits and 
privates compares favorably with the purchas-
ing power of the Chinese peasant, and the pay 
of noncommissioned officers approximates that 
of semiskilled and skilled civilian factory 
workers. The pay of officers is close to that of 
professional civilians. The following table pre-
sents the ranks and estimated pay structure of 
the Chinese Communist Army as standardized 
in 1956 and modified in 1958. In addition to the 
base pay shown, there are certain fringe bene-
fits and allowances. 
Chinese Communist r ank 
RANK AND PAY STRUCTURE 
CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY 
United States equivalent 
'senior MarshaL__ ____ __ _________ ___ (None) _________________ ______ ____ _ 
.MarshaL _________ ___ - ___ --________ General of the Army _______________ _ 
S enior General__ _______ ____ ________ General ____________ ____ ____ ___ ____ _ 
[Colonel] GeneraL__________________ Lieutenant GeneraL __________ _____ _ 
Lieutenant GeneraL____ ____________ Major GeneraL _____ ____ ___ ____ ___ _ 
]dajor General _____________________ . Brigadier General _______ ______ ____ _ 
Senior ColoneL_____________________ (None) _______________ ____ ________ _ 
-ColoneL___________________________ ColoneL _____________ __ ___ ______ __ _ 
Lieutenant ColoneL _________________ Lieutenant ColoneL ____ ____ _______ _ _ 
]dajor_____________________________ Major ______ _____ ___ ______ ________ _ 
Senior Captain______ _______________ (None) _______________ ___________ _ _ 
.captain ___________ _________________ Captain _____________ ______ _______ _ _ 
First LieutenanL___________________ First LieutenanL ______ ____ _____ ___ _ 
Second Lieutenant_______ ___________ Second Lieutenant _________ ______ __ _ 
W a rrant Officer ____________________ . Warrant Officer ______ __ _____ ____ __ _ 
Senior SergeanL___________________ Sergeant Major ____________ ________ . 
Master Sergeant 
SergeanL__________________________ Sergeant First Class __ _____ ______ __ _ 
Staff Sergeant 
.corporal [Junior Sergeant] ____ ______ SergeanL ___________ ______ __ _____ _ _ 
Corporal 
Private First Class______ ___________ Private First Class ___ ____ ___ ______ _ 
Private Second Class______ ____ ______ Private _______________ ____ _______ _ _ 
Recruit__ ____ ___________ ___________ Recruit ______________ __ ___________ _ 
Section III. MANPOWER AND PROCUREMENT 
Estimated monthly pay 
(U . S . dolla r equ ivalent) 
(Unknown) 
(Unknown) 
(Unknown) 
(Unknown) 
(Unknown) 
(Unknown) 
(Unknown) 
$85.00 
$70.00 
$60.00 
$50.00-60.00 
$40.00 
$35.00-40.00 
$28.00-33.00 
$23.00-27.00 
$6.00 
$5.00 
$4.00 
$2.50 
$2.50 
$2.50 
.68. GENERAL considered physically fit. As of the end of 1959, 
Manpower is not a factor that limits the size 
{)f the Chinese Communist Armed Forces. Of a 
total population of 667,560,000 (as of 1 January 
1960), there are an estimated 173,760,000 males 
-of the ages 15 to 49, of whom 84,850,000 are 
about 7,000,000 had had military service. 
69. THE CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM 
a. Prior to the adoption of the Constitution 
in 1954 and the passage of the Military Service 
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Law in 1955, manpower for the Chinese Com-
munist Armed Forces was obtained by a so-
called "volunteer" system. "Volunteering" was 
induced by appeals to patriotism, pressures on 
the recruit's family, threats, or resort to "press-
gang" methods. Local ,authorities were given 
quotas to fill, and certain categories tended to 
be exempted. Enlistment was for an indeter-
minate period with no promise of ever being 
permitted to leave the service. 
b. The new Constitution of 1954 stated: "It 
is the sacred duty of every citizen of the 
People's Republic of China to defend the home-
land. It is an honorable duty of citizens of the 
People's Republic of China to perform military 
service according to law." Almost immediately 
a test was made of the proposed conscription 
law which was subsequently enacted on 1 July 
1955. 
c. The Military Service Law of 1955 pre-
scribes that when a male citizen reaches the age 
of 18 he is liable for military service and must 
register. The individual registers with the vil-
lage councils or city police stations, and the 
registrations are forwarded through the local 
and provincial administrative agencies to Peip-
ing where provincial conscription quotas are 
determined and are assigned to provinces by the 
State Council. Provincial military service com-
mittees further assign quotas to political sub-
divisions within the provinces. At the lowest 
level, military service committees select in-
dividuals for conscription according to criteria 
set forth in the military service laws and regu-
lations. Those selected are given a physical 
examination and inducted by military service 
bureaus of local military territorial commands. 
The military service law makes no provisions 
for voluntary enlistment although young men 
desiring to enlist probably can arrange for their 
selection with their local military service com-
mittee. Conscripts have no choice of service, 
and the vast majority of selectees are assigned 
to the ground forces. The conscription year 
runs from 1 March through 28 February of the 
succeeding year. The annual registration and 
draft period is from 1 November through 28 
February of the succeeding year. Female spe-
cialists may be drafted into the peacetime re-
serve and mobilized in time of need. 
d. The term of service is three years for the 
Army and public security forces, four years for 
the Air Force and Naval security forces, and 
five years for Naval forces. The term of service 
may be extended as much as four months with-
out specific authority, and the Ministry of Na-
tional Defense may further extend an individ-
ual's term of active service. Although no pro-
visions are made for reenlistment, a small num-
ber of selected specially qualified enlisted men 
are permitted to remain on extended active 
duty. 
e. Officer personnel are obtained by commis-
sioning service school graduates and noncom-
missioned officers who pass selective examina-
tions or who have attended special training 
courses. In wartime, battlefield commissions 
may be given. Most new officers under present 
conditions have at least an elementary school 
(six-year) education acquired either prior to 
their entry into the service or by off-duty 
schooling in the Army. Age criteria for com-
missioned personnel are established by the mili-
tary service law. Promotions to and within 
general-officer grade are made by the State 
Council, to and within field grade by the Minis-
try of National Defense, and within company 
grade by the military region commanders or 
chief of the appropriate arm or service. Au-
thority to place general and field-grade officers 
on the reserve list or retire them lies with the 
Premier and Minister of National Defense, re-
spectively. Similar authority over company-
grade officers is vested in the field commanders 
and chiefs of the arms and services. 
Section IV. TRAINING AND SCHOOLS 
70. RESPONSIBILITIES FOR TRAINING 
Training in the ground forces is divided for-
mally into three categories: Military, political, 
and "cultural". The first is the responsibility of 
military commanders, under the supervision of 
the General Training Department of Headquar-
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; the latter two are the responsibility 
under the Geut:ral Political 
In practice, however, Generrd 
Department takes prec,edence and exer-
supervisory iunctionover the 
Department, even in training 
pureJymHitary. Within the 
units, moreover, political infiuen{;e 
every vIlase the ltaining program. 
THE TRAINING CYCLE 
There if; shmdal'd tnduing ye::tr for an 
freely modified to accord "yUh type 
geographicftl or cHmatic.eonditions, t,md 
<1H"'H,;1.L responsibilities, This trttining year 
of 140 training days in 7 training 
so scheduled through the calendar year 
between training. periods wHI 
with the pet'iods when troops will be 
for produdion or construction duties. 
6. Under the cycle, each month is 
.··.w'nn'o"" of training weeks of five train-
last two or 
days axe used 
for Ullit housekeeping, 
the Chinese soldier's "day 
in semisnpet'vised study-and .' ..... "~4 
caJ 
c.The yenrhegins April, 
the receipt and processing oftht~ ammaFcrop 
recruits, and progl'esses through individuru<Uld 
small unit trai11ing (fig. 36) ; then through 
pany! battalion,t'tnd re!:,rimental.· training; .' and 
culminates in regiulel1tal,divisional, or higher 
level maneuvers in November and December. 
Testin.g, of both individuals and units, is 
tinning process, tel'minating in end-of-the-year 
inspections, Units are aHowed,onoccasioll, 
acceleratetheil' training hut .,; ..... ' ... B.· 
nation standards a,re not lo\v(;wed, 
pears that the t'equired number of 
honrslTIust be spent on 
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72. TRAINING METHODS AND TRENDS 
a. The Chinese Communists recognize that 
the effectiveness of any training program is 
dependent on the qualifications of the instruc-
tors. They have met this problem in their 
Armed Forces by providing courses for instruc-
tors prior to the beginning of the training year, 
by establishing off-duty schools to give middle-
school and specialized college educations to all 
cadres, and by leaning heavily on "old soldiers" 
to instruct recruits in the elements of drill, mili-
tary customs and courtesies, and the handling 
of weapons (fig. 37). 
b. Concurrent training in the field receives 
special emphasis, with a view to combining in-
struction in many subjects in as short a time 
as possible under realistic conditions. Night 
training is considered of great importance (fig. 
38). Each unit participates in a campaign for 
"one specialty and many skills" , in which each 
Figure 37. Artillery Squad leader Instructs a Recruit 
in His Dutys. 
Figure 38. Field Exercises at Night. 
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itaier is expected to b~mepro1l<de1l;tinse\1;' 
1t)l}jobS. . •... . ... ...... •.... .. ~~;~. Tbe "Military' Thought· ofM.o';f~tungr? 
I~. 22) is considered the basietmdMlee in 
i~training and1n all Strategieortacticalplan., 
~fng. It is actuall'y a>compendiUm ofMAO~$ 
~tudies on strategy?tacti~,and politit»-mili-
~ry relationships from the late lQ2Cfsto date. 
training doctrine states that, at.variouEt~ta~(JS bf the CbineseGommunist· .Fevolution,. MAO 
provided specinc S()lutio~. foritnmediate m1U", 
tary problems, but that tnesltpast.soluttons ate 
not intended to be applied bUndlyto present or 
future conditions. The '4fundamental principles 
of Marxism-Leninism", applied by MAO under 
previous circumstances,. are to be studied. and 
reapplied, to present conditions. after the man.., 
nerofMAO. 
73. OFFICERAl'ID NCO TRAINING 
a. Noncommi$Sionedoffieersin the. CCAare 
drawn primarily from the conscripts in their 
second or third year of service. Privates who 
have shown promise, militarily and politically t 
are sent to the division training Qattalioo. whete 
they receive a . tbtee~month courSe to. qualify 
them as squad leaders. Gr.aduates retu.rn to 
their units and are aSSigned as squad leaders or . 
assistant squad leaders. in the grade of cOrPOral. 
Subsequent training, except in technical· spe-
cialties, is on. the job .. 
b. Junior oftleers are drawn from two sources 
-civilian school graduates who nave .1. t~hni~ 
calor administrative ba.ekgroundand ~recom­
missioned as speCialists, a.nd noncommission~ 
officers who have demonstrated their command 
ability and political reliability Mld have success-
fully completed a basic course at a service 
school. Political· officers receive. on-the .. job 
training in military specialties, and all officers 
attend off-duty schools to raiseth,eireducational 
level and. increase their professional compe-
tence. 
c. Commanders and political officers above 
company level and staff officers, specialists, and 
administratiVe cadres. are required to spend 
severalmonthseach year as privates or as pIa:' 
toon or company officers (fig. 39). This pro:-
gram is regardedasbothpoIiticalandmilitary 
training, intended to improve omcer~nl~ 
relations and tofamilarize those going. ubaektb 
the ranks" with current problems,. activiqcm, 
and .attitudes at basic levels in the irmed f~ces. 
74 •.. THE MII.ITARY·· SCHOOl· SYSTEM . 
TheChineseCommu;nistshavee~bJish~ 
a~equate and well.,coordinated milttlu-:v .se~~~~:~> 
system, providing for branch trli,inihl'. 
cers of alllevels,andfol' technieal 
specialists in such tieldsas etuzinleer: 
mechanics, radio or radar o~~a.ticD; 
medicine, and chemical warf.are; 
include· neeessary "cultural" cOllni$ 
basic mathematics, and 
courseS varying with the 
omnipresent· political.(Wu.r~ 
though formerly present itHi:lfl1'J\P,.,ll 
to have been withdrawn f1'Qln 
entire system launder the 
the General Traming De~~ 
eral Political DE!par~~nt"b;f' 
PLA. A strong 
military sen,ooling:':all(J,>' 
nicld and Jeadership .. 
Forces. 
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75. TROOP LABOR VERSUS TRAINING 
a. The Chinese Communist Armed Forces 
are considered a tool of the Party both for com-
bat and for "socialist construction". Under a 
January 1959 directive of the PLA General 
Political Department, every troop unit is re-
quired to spend from one to two months an-
nually on agricultural or industrial projects 
(fig. 40). Such utilization of the man-power 
pool available in the Armed Forces is intended 
to contribute to the national economy by mak-
ing troop units partially self-sufficient and by 
using troop labor to fill gaps in the overall pro-
duction effort. It is further intended to improve 
relationships between the military and the civil 
populace. 
b. Since intervals between phases of the an-
nual training cycle are scheduled to coincide 
with periods when the demand for labor is 
greatest, and since the schedule is sufficiently 
flexible to permit considerable readjustment, 
the troop labor program presents no serious 
Figure .40. Troops Building a Reservoir. 
obstacle to accomplishing the prescribed train-
ing goals. Disaster relief, emergency projects, 
and operation requirements may also demand 
considerable rescheduling of training, but the 
training time actually spent by the PLA com-
pares favorably with that spent by United 
States Forces. 
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CHAPTER 6. LOGISTICS 
Section I. GENERAL 
76. GENERAL 
The Chinese Communist Army, with Soviet 
material and advisory assistance, has been re-
organizing since 1954 to provide increased tech-
nical and logistical support at all levels. Al-
though considerable improvement is evident in 
comparison with Chinese Communist units em-
ployed in Korea, Chinese Communist units still 
are not so well equipped or logistically sup-
ported as were United States units during 
World War II. The Chinese Communist Army 
is primarily equipped with Soviet-type mate-
riel, and its logistical system and practices gen-
erally follow those of the Soviet Army. The 
Chinese Communists were, in the past, able to 
satisfy only the minimal logistic requirements 
of their forces. With modernization, however, 
there will result a greater strain on the trans-
portation network and supply system than here-
tofore because of dependence on heavier equip-
ment. It is believed that the increased logistic 
requirements in any future major operation 
would severely tax their logistical system. 
Section II. PROCUREMENT AND STORAGE 
77. PROCUREMENT 
a. Materiel and Supply Categories. The Chi-
nese Communists have four categories of sup-
ply: 
(1) Rations; 
(2) Clothing and equipment; 
(3) Fuels; and 
(4) Ammunition and ordnance equipment. 
Rations include both food and forage. Organi-
zational and individual clothing and equipment, 
excluding ordnance and major engineer equip-
ment, fall within the second category. Fuels are 
divided into POL and solid fuels, i.e., coal, char-
coal, and wood. The fourth category includes 
both individual and crew-served weapons, am-
munition, vehicles, small parts for weapons and 
vehicles, demolition materials, chemical bombs, 
gas masks, and protective clothing. 
b. Priorities and AUocations. The State 
Council determines basic policies for fiscal allo-
cations and apportioning of material resources 
for national defense. Within the State Council, 
the First Ministry of Machine Building is be-
lieved to control the nation's defense industries 
and to establish the priorities for production 
and procurement of military supplies. Alloca-
tions to the various services within the Armed 
Forces are established by the Ministry of Na-
tional Defense subject to approval by the State 
Council. The General Rear Service Department 
of the Headquarters, PLA is charged with over-
all logistical responsibility. Specific require-
ments and procurement programs probably are 
prepared by the headquarters of the arms and 
services. 
c. Procurement Sources. Local procurement 
still is common and probably is coordinated by 
the rear service staff and its agencies. Rations 
are frequently purchased locally, and troop 
units are encouraged to grow their own vege-
tables and to raise animals for meat with which 
to supplement regular rations (fig. 41). Re-
gional commands maintain close liaison with 
civilian manufacturing plants and warehouses 
and are permitted to make purchases within 
their budgetary allowances. Individual and or-
ganizational clothing and equipment is pro-
duced both by clothing factories under state 
control and by the production section of the 
General Rear Service Department. POL re-
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Figure 4L Units Provide Much of Their Own Food. 
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sources are limited and depend to a great extent 
on imports. Other fuels are procured locally by 
rear service units. Military vehicles are pro-
cured from both domestic and foreign sources. 
The Chinese Communists produce much of their 
small arms, mortars, recoilless rifles, rocket 
launchers, light and medium artillery pieces, 
and ammunition. They are producing trucks 
and have recently developed the capability to 
produce limited numbers of Soviet-type medium 
tanks. However, they are still dependent upon 
the Soviet Union and the Bloc countries for 
much of their armored equipment; heavy artil-
lery and its ammunition; and specialized tech-
nical equipment. 
78. STORAGE 
a. System of Storage. The storage and issue 
of supplies is believed to be accomplished 
through supply depots maintained by the mili-
tary region command 1 under the supervision of 
the region rear service department (fig. 42). 
Each military region may have three or more 
major supply depots to which supplies are 
Figure 42. Rear Area Storage. 
Figure 43. Division Supply Dump. 
transported directly from the factories, arsen-
als, and civilian warehouses, or from the rail-
head if the items have been imported. From the 
depots, supplies are distributed to subdepots or 
to army-level supply installations from where 
they are further distributed to division or regi-
mental dumps (fig. 43). In each of these dis-
tributions, the senior echelon is responsible for 
transportation of the supplies to the subordi-
nate echelon. 
b. Stockpiles. In view of the modernization 
program which began in 1954, stockpiles prob-
ably are limited to minor quantities of older 
items which have been removed from service. 
Not all units are standard-equipped with major 
items, and it is doubtful that any significant 
stockpiling has been accomplished. Rations and 
clothing are generally procured on a yearly 
production basis with little opportunity for 
stockpiling. Not all units have received the 
newer weapons and heavy equipment, includ-
ing armor, a fact which indicates that produc-
tion of these items has not yet matched demand 
and that they are not being stockpiled. Am-
munition production exceeds normal training 
requirements and current operational expendi-
tures and probably has permitted some stock-
piling. 
Section III. SUPPLY 
79. RESPONSIBILITY 
The quartermaster section of the r ear service 
departments is responsible for the supply of 
both individual and organizational clothing and 
equipment. POL is requisitioned by the r egion 
rear service department, whereas solid fuels are 
the responsibility of the food and forage section 
of the rear services unit at army level. Ammu-
nition is requisitioned directly from arsenals 
1 Mili tary R egions a re w it h in main land Ch ina an d generally are adaptable to a peacetime situation. F ron ts and t heater s are organ· 
ized in wartim e a nd for logist ics pur poses m ay be consider ed s imilar to m ilitar y regions. 
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and stored in military region dumps for distri-
bution by the regional command ordnance offi-
cer. Vehicles, spare parts, and tools are also 
requisitioned by the regional command ord-
nance officer. Water supply is a function of the 
engineer in each organization. 
80. SUPPLY CHANNELS 
The region commander, through his rear 
service staff, combines overall theater logistical 
planning with the operation of the supply sys-
tem. This arrangement provides the initial 
tactical link between the armed services and 
national sources of war materiel. From theater 
sources, supplies are moved directly to army-
level logistics facilities in or near the combat 
zone, from which the army rear service staff is 
responsible for moving supplies forward to 
using units. Supply responsibilities are main-
tained at each subordinate echelon within the 
normal chain of command with requisitions 
being consolidated by the higher headquarters. 
The impetus for supply movement is forward 
from the higher to the lower commands. 
Section IV. MOVEMENT 
81. GENERAL 
a. The Chinese Communists move troop units 
by rail, by motor, by air, and by foot both in 
China and in theaters of operations. Reserves 
and reinforcements in combat are moved as far 
forward as possible by rail or motor vehicles, 
often assuming tactical march formations after 
they detrain or detruck. The limited number 
of aircraft probably would restrict air move-
ment to airborne operations and to the ad-
ministrative movement of command and tech-
nical personnel. 
b. Troop movements are divided into two 
general categories by the Chinese Communists ~ 
movement by transportation means and 
marches. Transportation means are used to 
move units from one place to another when 
there is little or no threat of ground attack. 
Marches are most often conducted in the for-
ward area of a combat zone. 
82. RAfl MOVEMENTS 
Troops traveling by rail are, for the most 
part, carried in 30-ton freight cars, with the 
platoon serving as the basic unit of car loading. 
Notwithstanding the varying size of platoons, 
an average of 48 persons, their personal weap-
ons and equipment, and the platoon's organiza-
tional equipment are loaded in a boxcar. Heavier 
or more bulky items, such as tanks, artillery, 
and trucks, are hauled on 30· to 50-ton flatcars 
(fig. 44) ; animals ride in high-sided gondolas. 
A typical train of both troops and equipment 
will average 30 cars and carry the equivalent 
Figure 44. Armored Force on the Move. 
of 1 infantry battalion. As a result of POL 
shortages and the inadequacies of the roads, 
probably at least 85 percent of the long-distance 
moves on the mainland are accomplished by rail. 
83. MOTOR MOVEMENTS 
a. The Chinese Communists generally lack 
experience in large-scale motor marches, and 
their overall efficiency is relatively low. How-
ever, Communist recognition of the flexibility 
and speed of concentration offered by motor 
transportation, coupled with increased numbers 
of vehicles for the ground forces, probably will 
result in increased use of the motor march. In 
most areas of densely populated China, high-
ways parallel railroads; however, they are not 
well maintained and they are not all-weather 
in many instances. As a result, only five per-
cent of troop movements are believed to be made 
by motor transport. Short hauls accomplish the 
movement of tremendous tonnages but do not 
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compare favorably with rail movement on a 
ton X mileage basis. 
b. Operating over typical Chinese roads, mili-
tary convoys average 15 miles per hour during 
daylight and travel about 120 miles per day. At 
night the speed is reduced to about 10 miles per 
Figure 45. Infantry Troops Move Up. 
hour. A typical truck load consists of 13 to 16 
men, their personal gear, and a proportionate 
share of organizational equipment (fig. 45) . 
84. AIR MOVEMENT 
Not much is known of Chinese Communist 
capabilities to make administrative air move-
ments for non-airborne troops. It is believed, 
however, that only high-priority equipment and 
personnel would be airlifted because of other 
demands for the limited number of aircraft. 
The tactical movement of airborne troops is 
possible; however, the limited capacity of avail-
able aircraft precludes the airdrop of heavy 
equipment (fig. 46). 
85. WATER MOVEMENT 
Military water movement is normally limited 
to the transport of supplies except in the em-
ployment of troops in a waterborne operation. 
The limited standard lift capability, utilizing 
Figure 46. Aerial Resupply. 
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mllItary-type mvaslOn craft,coUld be aug. 
mented by the thollsands of junks which are 
ava.ilable in coastal areas and could carry troOps 
with light equipment (fig. 47). The waterways 
often restrict the size of the craft that can be 
utilized and add to the shipment time owing to 
the slow· rate of travel. However, in tons X 
miles about 10 percent of the military move-
ment of supplies is by water. 
86. FOOT MOVEMENTS 
Prior to the increase in motor transport units, 
the Chinese Communists considered the foot 
march, the most reliable method for large-scale 
troop movements, and great emphasis still is 
placed on march conditioning (fig. 48). Now, 
however, administrative marches are made only 
when transportation is lacking. The normal 
march day is 7 to 8 hours; a march of 10 or 12 
hours is regarded as a forced march. The maxi-
mum for forced marches is 16 hours per day. 
Daylight marches average 3 miles per hour over 
roads, whereas night marches average 2 miles 
Figure 48. Approach March. 
Figure 47. Supply by Water. 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY AGO 
per hour. Cross-country march rates are re-
<luced to 1 mile per hour. Modification of these 
rates is necessary if great distances are in-
volved; for instance, in Korea large units 
marched 200 to 300 miles but averaged only 20 
miles per day. 
Section V. MATERIEL REPAIR, MAINTENANCE, EVACUATION, AND SALVAGE 
37. RESPONSIBILITY 
Repair and maintenance of equipment is a 
command responsibility ; however, standards are 
low, facilities limited, and trained technicians 
Jlre few. The Chinese have three categories of 
maintenance and repair-"minor", "medium", 
Jlnd "major"-but there is no clear distinction 
between these categories. · It appears that the 
Jlbility or inability to perform the maintenance 
Jlnd repair, rather than the category, determines 
the echelon at which it is performed. 
38. PERSONAL EQUIPMENT 
The maintenance of individual clothing and 
€quipment below army level is the responsibil-
ity of the quartermaster section of rear service 
units. "Minor" clothing repairs are accom-
Figure 49. Shoe Repair. 
plished by the individual soldiers; and, prior to 
seasonal issues, "major" repair programs are 
undertaken by theater or military region com-
mand installations utilizing civilian facilities 
within the army area (fig. 49) . 
89. ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT 
a. Individual and crew-served weapons and 
vehicles comprise the major items of equipment 
in this category that require maintenance. Us-
ing units at company and battalion level begin 
the process by performing necessary preventive 
maintenance. Regimental units perform "mi-
nor" repairs, which include periodic checks, 
replacement of subassemblies, and fabrication 
of simple tools. "Medium" repairs are per-
formed at division and major army unit level. 
Neither parts nor facilities are available at 
division level or below for "major" repairs. 
b. Repair at army level is minimal since army 
units must remain mobile in time of combat 
(fig. 50). Materiel which cannot readily be re-
paired at army level is either cannibalized for 
parts or sent to a salvage and rebuild installa-
tion of the theater or military region command. 
Figure 50. Ordnance Field Repair. 
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Major ite~s of equipment da.ma~ in combat 
s~ldom.v~ replac~ eJCt;tpt· during prolon~ 
engagements, and even then replacement parts 
frequently may not be available. Therefore, 
attrition rates are high in comparison with those 
of Western Armies. 
c. Recovery of equipinent from the battle-
field is stressed by the Chinese Communists. 
Theater technical ~ice chiefs are responsible 
for. instituting a recovery program. The army 
transportation officer is responsible for recover-
ing vehicles in coordination with the army ord-
nance officer, and the latter also supervises the 
collection of other ordnance equipment. At 
army and division level each service maintains 
a collecting point for salvage materiel at rear 
area supply installations. Below division a 
single point is established for salvage of all 
classes of matedal.Special regimental, bat-
talion, or company teams are organ.ized to 
search the battle area and collect materiel for 
salvage (fig. 51). Figure 51. Salvage Collection. 
Section VI. MEDICAL SERVICES 
90. EVACUATION 
(k The.·Chinese ·Communists' medical evacua-
tion prograD) emphasizes saving of the wounded 
for future ~bat rather than upon the saving 
of human life. By Western standards, evacua" 
tion, medical care, and the qUality of medical 
per$()nnel are poor. Within the wartime theater 
conunaDd, there ·are three echelons of evaeua-
tJC)11: (1) To regiment (2) to army, and (3) 
tQ~y group or theater. 
b .•. .. Initial evacuation ofa @$ualty from the 
battlefield isaecomplished by company aid.men 
who aI$O administer first aid (fig. 52). Bat-
~i()ll. teams evacuate from cQmpany a~ to 
tl1e battalion aid station where doctors provide 
~lley. treatment prior to evaeuation to 
regimen~ where moredoetorsand medical per;. 
sonnel are available for emergency operations, 
claasi1ication, and record administration (fig. 
68). 
c. Evacuation from· regiment to army is ac-
complished by utilizing returning supply vehi-
Figure •. ·52~··· FimAid in the .... 1tte Ai-ea. 
cles first to.a division field hospital then on to 
mobile field army hospitals. Each army has 
from 2 to· I) mobile field hospitals and· a field 
hospital and is equipped to provide extensive 
care. Most surgery is performed at army level 
except ·fo.r cases requiring long convalescence. 
d. The medical units and hospitals of the 
army group or theater COD)mand either care for 
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figure 53. Evacuation by Utter Bearers; 
8upe1"viseclearing battlefield, 
burial sltes, and perform necessary ee:relUOlt:l:l 
DetaiJed . records are kept foriield-grade and 
general offieets,and their shipped 
home for All others are interred by 
mass burial, sometimes ilIa ,~ommon.grave. 
Casualty . reports are forwarded through com~ 
maud,· politica 1, and medical channels to provIde 
the basis for requests.for.replacements·and:for 
pension payments. to the serviceman's survivors. 
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CHAPTER 7. WEAPONS 
Section I. GENERAL 
92. GENERAL 
The Chinese Communist Army currently is 
in the midst of a materiel modernization pro-
gram. The progress of this program in the field 
of conventional weapons is evident from the 
continuing identification of modern Soviet-type 
weapons in the hands of CCA units. Some of 
the newer, more complex conventional weapons 
continue to be imported from the U.S.S.R., but 
others are produced in local factories which 
previously produced Soviet World War II-type 
weapons. The Chinese Communist production 
includes infantry weapons, artillery weapons 
up to 152-mm caliber, and some medium tanks. 
While self-sufficiency in the production of all 
weapons is undoubtedly a goal of the Chinese 
Communists, it has not yet been achieved. As 
newer weapons become available, the older 
weapons are relegated to the militia or to re-
serve stockpiles. 
93. EVALUATION 
The Chinese Communist Army is essentially 
an infantry army, but in recent years the in-
creased availability of heavy weapons has re-
sulted in more effective artillery and armored 
support. Prior to 1950, the Army was equipped 
with a heterogenous collection of weapons of 
diverse calibers and origins which aggravated 
the problems of maintenance and ammunition 
supply; now, however, with Soviet aid, stand-
ardization has greatly reduced the number of 
types of spare parts and calibers of ammunition 
required. It must be noted, however, that with 
the addition of armor and heavier artillery the 
Army has become far more road bound than it 
was prior to 1950. Thus, there has been an 
accompanying increase in logistical require-
ments and a marked decrease in cross-country 
mobility. With weapons currently available. 
the Army has improved its capability for en-
gaging in a fast moving, all-weather, non-
nuclear war on the mainland of Asia. 
Section II. INFANTRY 
94. PISTOLS 
a. The Soviet 9-mm pistol Makarov and the 
9-mm machine pistol Stechkin are believed to 
be standard. The Makarov, an enlarged version 
of the pre-World War II German Walther 
pistol, is a double-action, self-loading semiauto-
matic pistoL The Makarov is blowback oper-
ated, has an 8-round magazine, and is effective 
up to 50 meters. The Stechkin is a far more 
imposing weapon than the Makarov. It is a 
true machine pistol capable of either automatic 
or semiautomatic fire, is a lethal weapon at 100 
meters, has a 20-round magazine, and is blow-
back operated. 
b. The Chinese Communists stilI have in 
service large quantities of the old Soviet 
7.62-mm TT-M1933 pistol and the Chinese-
made copy thereof, the Type 51 (fig. 54). Both 
are Simplified versions of the United States 
caliber ,45 mm 1911 Colt, fed by an 8-round 
magazine. 
95. SUBMACH!NEGUNS 
The Soviet 7.62-mm AK (Chinese Type 56) 
submachinegun in two versions-one with a 
fixed wooden butt and the other with a folding 
metal butt-is the standard shoulder arm of the 
Chinese Communist Army (fig. 55). The AK 
fires the Soviet 7.62-mm intermediate-size M43 
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~md 
submachim~gtl.ns 
The same cartridge used· in 
(Chinese Type 56) squad light machinegun and 
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Figure 57. Chinese Communist 7.62-mm Submachinegun, 
Type 43 (Soviet PPS, M 1954). Also shown are 
Chinese Communist Stick Hand Grenades. 
Figure 58. Chinese Communist 7.62-mm Semiautomatic 
Carbine, Type 56 (Soviet SKS). 
Figure 59. Chinese Communist 7.62-mm Carbine, Type 53 (Soviet M 1944). 
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97. MACHINEGUNS 
The standard squad light machinegun of the 
Army is the Soviet 7.62-mm RPD (Chinese 
Type 56) light machinegun (fig. 60). This 
weapon is a gas-operated, belt-fed, bipod-
mounted automatic weapon which fires the same 
7.62-mm cartridge as the AK (Chinese Type 
56) submachinegun and the SKS (Chinese 
Type 56) semiautomatic carbine. The standard 
Figure 60. Chinese Communist 7.62-mm Squad 
Light Machinegun, Type 56 (Soviet RPD). 
Figure 61. Chinese Communist 7.62-mm light 
Machinegun, Type 53 (Soviet DPM). 
company-level light machinegun is the Soviet 
7.62-mm RP-46, also gas-operated, belt-fed, 
and bipod-mounted, but heavier than the RPD 
and firing the older long 7.62-mm rimmed car-
tridge. The older Soviet 7.62-mm DP and DPM 
are still in service but are being replaced (fig. 
61). At battalion level, the 7.62-mmSoviet 
Goryunov, M1943 (Chinese Type '53) heavy 
machinegun is standard (fig. 62). It is an air-
Figu~e 62. Chinese Communist 7.62-mm Heavy 
Machmegun, Type 53 (Soviet Goryunov M 1943). 
Figure 63. Chinese Communist 12.7-mm Heavy 
Machinegun, Type 54 (Soviet DShK, M 1938/46). 
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cooled, gas-operated weapon, mounted on 
wheels, and can be used for antiaircraft fire. 
It is fed by a 250-round nondisintegrating 
metal-link belt. The older Soviet 12.7 -mm 
DShK, M1938 and M1938/ 46 (Chinese Type 
54) (fig. 63), the new 14.5-mm ZPU-2 dual and 
ZPU-4 quadruple antiaircraft machineguns are 
used primarily as antiaircraft weapons against 
low-level air attack but are also used as ground 
support weapons (fig. 64). The ZPU models do 
not have off-carriage fire control; traverse and 
elevation are manual. 
Figure 64. Soviet 14.5-mm ZPU-4 Heavy Machinegun. 
Figure 65. Chinese Communist 90-mm Rocket launcher, 
Type 51 (U.S. M20). 
98. INFANTRY ANTITANK WEAPONS 
a. The standard infantry antitank weapons 
are a rocket launcher and two recoilless rifles, 
all Chinese-made and based on early post-World 
War II U.S. designs. The Chinese 90-mm, Type 
51, antitank rocket launcher is a copy of the 
United States 3.5-inch M20 but is less effective 
than its United States prototype because of in-
ferior ammunition (fig. 65). The 57-mm recoil-
less rifle, Type 36, a copy of the U.S. M18, was 
manufactured by the Nationalists and con-
tinued in production by the Communists (fig. 
66). It can be fired from the shoulder or from 
a Chinese copy of a Czechoslovak light machine-
gun tripod. Although of crude external work-
manship, the weapon is rugged and dependable. 
The 75-mm recoilless rifle, Type 52 is a copy of 
the U.S. 75-mm weapon but is mounted on a 
carriage of Chinese design (fig. 67). 
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· Chinese Communist 75-mm Recoilless Rifle, 
Type 52 (U.S. M20). 
b. The Chinese Communists are believed to 
be obtaining some modern Soviet infantry 
antita:q~ weapons ... and probably will produce 
Chin~~~>~opies oft~e Soviet R~G-2 . antit~..llk 
launcher all:d the &2-mm and .. l?7.-mm recoilless 
antitattk guns. The RPG-2 is a smooth-bore, 
shoulder-fired weapon which is essentially a 
recoilless grenade launcher and isa standard 
squad antitank . weapon . . It fires an 82-mm 
HEA.:I'grenade and has aneff~etiverange of 
165 yards. The Soviet smooth-bore 82-mm B-10 
and 107-mm recoilless guns are the tactical 
equivalents of the U.S. 75-mm and 106-mm 
recoille$S rifles, respectively. 
99. MORTARS 
The Chinese Communists use mortars exten-
sively, often as a substitute for artillery. The 
Soviet 82-mm M1937 (fig. 68), 120-mm M19~~ J 
(fig. 69), and 160-mm M1943 (fig. 70) mOl.".t~~fl! 
are standard and are being produced locall~~ :~ 
The 82-mm mortar can fire conventional 81-m~" 
mortar ammunition used by the United State:s. 
and other countries; it can be broken down int!> 
a ,three-roan or one-animal load .. . The 120-m,~ i 
mortars,despite their size, are relatively lig~t,'1 
highly mobile, and can easily be manhandled ' 
Figure 68. Chinese Communist 82-mm Mortar 
(Soviet M 1937). 
Figure 69. Chinese Communist 120-mm Mortar 
(Soviet M 1943). 
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100. GRENADeS 
trate up to 4 Df armor (fig. 72). 
gl'enades will replace the stiGk in 
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Figure 72. F-l Defensive Hand Grenade, RG-42 Offensive Hand Grenade, 
RPG-43 and RPG-6 Heat Hand Grenades (left to right). 
Section III. ARTILLERY 
101. FIELD ARTILLERY 
a. Chinese Communist artillery pieces range 
in caliber up to 152-mm. All standard pieces 
above 57-mm are of Soviet World War II or 
later design, and many are of local manufac-
ture. The principal artillery pieces now consid-
ered standard are the Soviet 85-mm field gun 
D-44 (fig. 73), the Soviet 122-mm howitzer 
M1938 (fig. 74), the 122-mm gun D-74 (fig. 
75), and the 152-mm gun-howitzer D-20 (fig. 
76). The 85-mm field gun is quite mobile. 
Maximum range is 17,000 yards, and armor 
penetration is up to 5.4 inches at 550 yards. 
The 122-mm howitzer is a well-designed weapon 
with good combat characteristics; maximum 
range is 13,000 yards, and its HEAT round can 
penetrate up to 4 inches of armor. The 122-mm 
gun and 152-mm gun-howitzer are also modern 
well-designed and mobile pieces. The 152-mm 
weapon is the principal weapon for counter-
battery and other long-range destructive and 
interdictory fire. Its maximum range is 19,000 
yards. 
Figure 73. Soviet 85-mm Field Gun, 0-44. 
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Figure 76. Soviet 152-mm Gun-Howitzer, 0-20. 
Figure 77. Soviet 130-mm Gun, M-46. 
of 6.5 inches; and the Soviet 152-mm Howitzer 
M1943 (fig. 80), which has a range of 13,560 
yards and penetrates up to 3.4 inches of armor 
at 550 yards. The varied assortment of old 
mountain and light artillery pieces in the in-
ventory probably are being declared obsolete as 
a result of the standardization effort and in-
ability to obtain replacements and parts. 
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Figure 79. Sovief 122.mm.Field Gun, iii 1931 / 37. 
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Figure 80. Chinese Communist 152-mm Howitzer, 
M 1943 (Soviet D-1). 
1 02. ANTITANK ARTILLERY 
The standard Chinese Communist antitank 
guns are the Soviet 57 -mm antitank gun M1943 
and its Chinese copy, the Type 55 (fig. 81), and 
the Soviet 85-mm field gun D-44 and its Chinese 
copy. The 57-mm antitank gun is an excellent 
piece for its class, although of limited value 
against heavy armor. Its principal disadvan-
tage is a somewhat excessive weight for an 
infantry antitank gun which must be man-
handled. Maximum range with HE is 9,00() 
yards, and it can penetrate up to 5.5 inches of 
armor at 550 yards. The characteristics of the 
85-mm field gun D-44 and the 76-mm field gun 
M1942 are discussed in the paragraph on field 
artillery. 
Figure 81. Chinese Communist 57-mm Antitank Gun, Type 55 (Soviet M 1943). 
Figure 82. Soviet 57-mm Antiaircraft Gun, 5-60. 
103. ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY 
The principal standard antiaircraft artillery 
pieces are the Soviet 57 -mm antiaircraft gun 
S-60 (fig. 82) and the 100-mm antiaircraft gun 
KS-19 (fig. 83). The older 37-mm antiaircraft 
gun, M1939 (fig. 84), some of which are still in 
service, was domestically produced and is called 
the Type 55. The 85-mm antiaircraft gun 
M1939 (fig. 85) is used with the Soviet 
PUAZO-3 antiaircraft director which dates 
from World War II. The 37-mm and 85-mm 
guns are being phased out in favor of the 57 -mm 
and 100-mm guns. 
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Figure 83. Soviet 100-mm Antiaircraft Gun, KS-19. 
Figure 84. Chinese Communist 37-mm Antiaircraft Gun, Type 55 (Soviet M 1939). 
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figure 85. Soviet. 85.l'nm Anfiaircroft Gon,M 1939. 
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Figure 88. Chinese Communist T-54 Medium Tank. 
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Figure 92. Soviet JSU-122 Self-Propelled Gun. 
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108. GENERAL 
Chinese Communist ammunition 
that for the Chinese infantry antitank weapons. 
-a direct copy of the Soviet prototype. Like 
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which are suitable for the purpose for which 
they are intended. The Chinese Communists 
produce all types of small-arms ammunition 
used by their forces, ammunition for mortars of 
all calibers they use, and much of their artillery 
ammunition. To facilitate manufacture, utili-
zation, and maintenance, emphasis is placed on 
simplicity and ruggedness coupled with a mini-
mum use of strategic materials. Chinese Com-
munist doctrine, based on Soviet doctrine, 
strongly emphasizes a high degree of inter-
changeability. This leads to great stress on the 
use of multipurpose weapons; for example, ar-
tillery weapons up to 152-mm caliber are pro-
vided with antitank ammunition. 
109. AMMUNITION TYPES 
a. Standard 7.62-mm Soviet type M43 small-
arms ammunition is interchangeable between 
the AKI submachinegun, the SKS carbine, and 
RPD squad light machinegun. The Soviet-type 
7.62-mm M08/30 rounds are used with the DP, 
DPM, RP-46 light and the Goryunov SG-43 
and SGM heavy machineguns. Various combi-
nations of anti-personnel, armor-piercing, 
tracer, and incendiary cartridges are available 
as are dummy and blank rounds. 
b. Chinese Communist mortar ammunition is 
of the conventional teardrop-shape, stabilized 
in flight by metal fins, and uses point-detonating 
fuses. Propellant charges are adjustable for 
desired ranges. The types of mortar ammuni-
tion known to be in use include fragmentation, 
high-explosive, smoke, leaflet, incendiary .. 
chemical, and illuminating. 
c. Chinese Communist artillery ammunition,. 
like its Soviet prototype, is classified as fixed or 
separate loading, the latter being subdivided 
into cartridge-case and powder-bag types. The 
major types of artillery projectiles used by the 
Chinese Communist forces include high ex-
plosive, armor-piercing, high explosive anti-
tank, high velocity armor-piercing, concrete-
piercing, incendiary, chemical, illuminating, and 
propaganda. The characteristics of these shells 
are similar to those of the United States, but 
their performance is below the United States 
standards. Artillery fuses are of orthodox de-
sign and classified as point detonating and base 
detonating and by their type of action, i.e., im-
pact, time and impact, and time. The Chinese 
are not believed to be producing the more 
sophisticated types of fuses, such as proximity 
(VT) fuses. 
Section VI. FIRE CONTROL 
110. ARTILLERY 
Chinese Communist field and antitank artil-
lery fire control equipment includes on-carriage 
telescopes and telescopes and associated equip-
ment, such as aiming circles, aiming posts, 
binoculars, gunner's quadrants, BC scopes, pro-
tractors, and slide rules. Separate telescopes 
are designed for the antitank and artillery 
pieces; both are obsolete by United States stand-
ards, but have greater accuracy than the weap-
ons they serve. 
111. ANTIAIRCRAFT 
The Chinese Communists are dependent upon 
Soviet-supplied antiaircraft fire-control instru-
ments. They use the Soviet WHIFF fire-control 
radar (fig. 96), a copy of the United States 
SCR-584, which can track aircraft at 20 nauti-
cal miles and is used with the Soviet 85-mm AA 
gun M39. The Puazo-3 gun director, which 
relies on visual tracking and is therefore obso-
lete, is used with the WHIFF. It has a slant 
range of 13,000 yards and a height range of 
31,000 feet. They also use a later improved 
Soviet gun director, the Puazo-6, and a later 
fire-control radar, the FIRE CAN. These newer 
models have a greater range and accuracy and 
are used with the 57-and 100-mm antiaircraft 
guns. 
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112. MINE TYPES 
a . . The Chinese Communist ground forces are 
capable of \vaging extensive mine warfare. 
However, until the Korean War they had UP 
standard mine warfare equipment and wel'e 
thus forced to rely on improvised and captured 
mines. Standard mines are all of basic Soviet 
design and include hoth Soviet~ 311d Chinese-
manufactured versions of the following: 
antitank mine, TMD-B 97) ; 
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Case 
Explosive 
Weight 
Dimensions 
Wood 
TNT 
17.0Ib 
l-13.4; W -11.5; Ht. - 5.0 in. 
Figure 97. Chinese Communist Wooden Antitank Mine, 
M1951 (Soviet TMD-B). 
i1"M-41 THT 
,5Z7-118-X-ltlt 
Case 
Explosive 
Weight 
Dimensions 
Metal 
Amatol 80/20 or flaked TNT 
12.01b 
Dia - 10.5; Ht - 5.8 in. 
Figure 98. Chinese Communist Metallic Antitank Mine 
(Soviet TM-41). 
Case 
Explosive 
Weight 
Dimensions 
Wood 
TNT 
140z 
l-7.5; W - 3.5; Ht - front 2.5; 
rear 2.0 in. 
Figure 99. Chinese Communist Wooden Antipersonnel 
Mine (Soviet PMD-6). 
b. Mines improvised from bangalore torpe-
does, artillery and mortar shells, aerial bombs, 
and hand grenades are frequently used (fig. 
101). They also use explosive-filled containers, 
such as tin cans, wooden boxes, fuel drums, 
barrels, glass bottles, clay pots, and other con-
tainers and packages. The three general types 
of improvised mines which may have mechani-
cal, chemical, or electrical fuses, are classified 
according to the external action necessary to 
detonate them, as follows: 
(1) Trip-wire mines. These mines are 
fitted with either pull wires or taut 
tension-release wires. 
(2) Pressure mines. These mines may have 
either a pressure or pull fuse, or an 
improvised circuit-closing device. 
(3) Automatic mines. These mines nor-
mally have an electric firing circuit 
broken by a time-delay device in the 
form of a clock or a makeshift time-
delay circuit closer. 
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Case 
Explosive 
Weight 
Dimensions 
Cast iron 
TNT 
4.41b 
Dia - 2.4; Ht - 5.3 in. 
Figure 100. Chinese Communist Antipersonnel Mine 
(Soviet POMZ-2). 
OPERATION 
Fragmentation grenade (with pin re-
moved) is placed in tin can, which 
is anchored to ground or tree. The 
grenade is attached to trip wire. 
1 Grenade in can. 
Figure 10l. Chinese Communist Improvised Mines. 
OPERATION 
Fragmentation grenade is placed in mud-
ball. When mud dries, pin is removed 
from grenade; actuated by breaking mud. 
2 Grenade in dried mud. 
Figure 10l-Continued. 
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OPERATION 
Pressure or puUfuzeis placed in 
mortar shell, and mortar shell is 
buried. 
figure 101-Continued. 
113. MiNE DETECTION EQUIPMENT 
Communist Chin~ is not known to produce 
mine detectors but imports limited quantities of 
the Soviet electronic mine detector, VIM-203 
(fig. 102). Engineer troops are instructed in 
the use of this detector which will detect metal-
lic mines.to a depth of not more than one foot. 
The primary methods. and by far the most 
widely used for detecting mines, are probing 
for buried mines and feeling with the hands for 
OPERATION 
Grenade is inserted in shell, with trip 
wire attached to grenade pull ring. 
.. Amllet')' shell mine. 
Figure 101-Continuect 
trip wires. Probes are issue items, and many 
more probably are improvised. Such probes are 
usually limited to a stout bamboo or other 
wooden pole with a sharpened wire end. Prob-
ing is accomplished by teams which divide the 
area and stick the probes into the ground to a 
depth. of from 2 to 5 inches. 
Figure 102. Soviet Mine Detector. VIM-203. 
fOR OffICIAl'SE ONLY 
90 AGO lOOl!A 
114. MINE LAYING, MARKINGr AND RECORD~ 
ING 
a,. Minefields are sited in order to permit 
maximum benefit from surroundjng terrain. 
Specific placing is done by the use of a spacing 
eord or by pacing (fig. 103). Standard mine-
fields are elementary and therefore easily laid 
by poorly trained troops. The officer in charge 
can, however, determine the pattern and thus 
may vary from the standard. While there is 
little uniformity of pattern, they generally fall 
into two general categories, the antitank-road 
pattern and the field-antitank and field antiper-
sonnel patterns, which are described below. 
(1) Antitank-road. 
(a) "W" pattern. In this pattern, mines 
are placed diagonally across a road 
in the form of a "\v". The mines 
are spaced 10 to 16 feet apart, .and 
the legs of the "w" may join or 
may be spaced as far as 75 feet apart 
at the closed end and 225 feet apart 
at the ouhvard end (fig. 104). 
(b) 3-2 box patter"n. The mines are 
spaced 3 to 10 feet apart across a 
road in rows that are from 7 to 75 
feet apart. Generally there are 5 
rows, the first row containing 3 
mines, the second row 2 mines, etc. 
(fig. 105). 
(0) Box-pattern. This pattern generally 
contains ' 8 mines. These are placed 
2 mines, 3 to 13 feet apart, in a row 
with 4 rf)\VS 3 to '33 feet apart. 
(d) Square pattern. In this pattern, 
there are 2 rows of 3 or 4 mines 
spaced 10 to 13 feet apart. These 
rows run across the road, and the 
distance between rO\V8 is equal to 
the width of the road. 
(e) Isolated triangle patie'm. In this 
pattern, 3 mines are placed at a 
distance of about 10 feet from each 
other. These triangles may be placed 
at distances f rom a few feet to sev-
eral miles apart. 
(2) Field patterns, antitank and antipet"-
sonnel. 
(a) Zig-zag pattC1'n. This is the primary 
pattern of which most others are 
variations. In this pattern, antitank 
mines are placed 10 feet apart paxal-
leI to the front, in a row 10 feet 
deep. Antipersonnel mines are usu-
ally placed 3 feet apart in a row 3 
feet in de.pth. Any group of 3 mines 
in this pattern forms a triangle (fig. 
106). . 
(b) Double zig-zag pattern. '1'his pattern 
is similar to the zig-zag except that 
a row gives the appearance of being 
1% rows of the zig-zag pattetn. In 
this double pattern, distances are 
the same for both antitank andanti2 
personnel mines. The distances be-
tween mines parallel to the ' front 
vary between 6.5 feet and· 33 .feet, 
and the depth of the row is the same ' 
as the distance between the ' mines 
(fig. 107). 
(e) 
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ond at an angle from left to right 
(fig. 108). 
(d) Antipersonnel trip-wire box pattern. 
This is a rectangular pattern using 
four mines placed 3 to 27 feet apart. 
The trip wires are attached from one 
mine to the next around the perim-
eter of the box pattern. 
(e) Mixed minefields. There are no 
standard procedures for mixing 
antitank and antipersonnel mines 
within a single minefield. The mix-
ing of mines is left entirely to the 
discretion of the officer in charge of 
the laying party. 
o 0 o 
o 0 o 
o o o o 
Figure 104. Antitank-Road "W" Pattern. 
0 0 0 
0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 
0 0 0 
Figure 105. Antitank-Road 3-2 Box Pattern. 
Figure 106. Antitank- or Antipersonnel-Field 
Zig-Zag Pattern. 
Figure 107. Antitank_ or Antipersonnel-Field Double 
Zig-Zag Pattern. 
b. Minefields in forward areas are not 
marked, except when friendly troops are to be 
withdrawn through them. In this instance, in-
dividual mines are marked until the friendly 
troops have passed through, then the markers 
are removed. In areas farther from the front, 
minefield boundaries may be marked with dead 
branches or rocks placed around the field or 
with poles at the corners with rope strung be-
tween them. Minefields outside the combat zone 
are marked with flags or by wooden markers 
bearing the Chinese characters for "danger" 
lettered in black. 
c. A minefield record with all relative data 
is maintained for all deliberate minefields. 
Hasty minefields are not recorded or reported. 
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Figure 108. Antitank- or Antipersonnel-Field Saw-Tooth Pattern. 
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Section VIII. CHEMICAL WARFARE WEAPONS 
115. AMMUNITION 
Chinese Communist chemical ammunition 
holdings are of Soviet ori.gin or design. Prior 
to receipt of this ammunition from the Soviets, 
the Chinese Communists had only the Japanese 
and U.S. smoke toundswhich they had captured 
from theJ apanese and the Nationalists. Mor-
tars and artillery pieces> of most calibers are 
adaptable to the use of · chemical rounds, and 
training is conducted in both offensive and de-
fensive use of toxic and bacterial agents. At 
present, the Chinese Communists do not have 
large stocks of toxic and bacterial agents and 
would be unable to conduct more than a small-
scale operation. Smoke shells are believed to be 
plentiful tor mortars and artillery pieces. Dur-
ing the Korean War the Chinese Communists 
demonstrated an excellent smoke screening 
capability. They also use a small l3-ounce So-
viet toxic smoke pot which contributes appre-
ciably to the sllloke screening potential, but 
adds little to the offensive toxic capability, The 
Chinese Communist inventory also includes sev-
eral other Soviet-supplied smoke pots some of 
whichweighup to 97 pounds. 
116. FLAME WEAPONS ; ";t 
The Chinese Communists'flame warfare no~ 
tential is growing, but it is still only moderateJ 
Their principal flame weapons are the Sovi~.~.~; 
type portable and emplaced flamethrowers~i 
They use the portable ROKS-3, which weigI1lf 
50 pounds and can fire 6 to 8 bursts from 35t\); 
40 yards, and the LPO (fig. 109). The latter is 
the latest model Soviet portable flamethrow~.r;~ 
and needs no separate pressure tank as does the: 
older ROKS=3. N () mechanized flamethrower; 
weapons have been reported in use by the Chi~9 
nese Communist forces. .. 
Figure 109. Soviet lPO Flamethrower. 
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CHAPTER 8. EQUIPMENT 
Section I. GENERAL 
117. GENERAL 
Communist China has a balanced Army of 
battle-tested units equipped primarily with 
World War II-type materiel of Soviet manufac-
ture or design. Local manufacture of military 
equipment is increasing; the bulk of it, how-
ever, is still imported from Bloc countries. The 
lack of skilled personnel often results in poor 
maintenance. To overcome the maintenance 
deficiencies, field commanders rely heavily on 
the individual soldier's inherent skill at impro-
vising. The ground forces are believed suffici-
ently equipped to maintain internal security 
and to conduct large-scale conventional war-
fare; however, they lack the equipment re-
quired for nuclear warfare. 
Section II. UNIFORMS AND INSIGNIA 
118. GENERAL 
Chinese Communist Army uniforms are pat-
terned along the lines of Soviet Army uniforms 
and consist of two principal types: The service 
and field uniform for all personnel and the dress 
uniform for officer personnel (fig. 110). Offi-
cers wear the service and field uniform for 
social functions, field training, and maneuvers, 
whereas the dress uniform is worn for parades, 
on official occasions, and at ceremonies. Enlisted 
personnel wear the service and field uniform for 
all occasions. The summer and winter service 
and field uniforms are dark olive-drab; how-
ever, nonstandard colors are in use which vary 
from brown to olive-green. The officers' winter 
dress uniform varies from dark blue to bluish 
green; the summer dress uniform is ivory-
colored. Special-purpose uniforms are designed 
for chemical decontamination, for armored 
forces, for paratroopers, and for camouflage 
and rain protection for all troops. Women's 
summer uniforms substitute a skirt and beret 
for the trousers and cap, but the women's 
winter uniforms are similar to those worn by 
the men. Insignia of rank and insignia of 
branch are both worn on collar tabs of the 
service and field uniform. Shoulder-boards are 
worn on the officers' dress uniform. 
119. SERVICE AND FIELD UNIFORMS 
a. Summer Uniforms. The summer service 
and field uniforms are generally made of wool 
or silk material for officers and of cotton mate-
rial for enlisted personnel. Officers wear either 
black low-cut leather shoes or black leather 
boots when wearing this uniform, while en-
listed personnel wear a low-quarter, light olive-
drab rubber and canvas "tennis" shoe, and re-
portedly a black or brown leather low-quarter 
shoe for garrison duty. Officers through field 
grade wear a Sam Browne belt; enlisted per-
sonnel wear a plain leather waist belt. The 
usual headgear for officers is the service cap and 
for enlisted personnel the garrison cap. The 
service cap has a chin strap of gold braid for 
marshals and generals and black leather for all 
other officers. Both officers' and enlisted per-
sonnel's uniforms are similar in design, except 
that the coat of enlisted personnel has no lower 
pocket. 
b. Winter Uniforms. The winter service and 
field uniform is similar to the summer uniform 
in design and is made of cotton material, quilted 
on the inside with cotton padding for all ranks. 
Officers' overcoats are made of part wool mate-
rial and are smartly cut. Enlisted personnel's 
overcoats are quilted on the inside with cotton 
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padding, are made of cotton material, and are 
bulky and shapeless in appearance. Fur or pile-
line caps, closely resembling the Soviet cap, are 
worn by all personnel in cold weather. Officers 
may wear either black leather boots or fur-lined 
olive-drab canvas boots with the winter uni-
form, while enlisted personnel have a brown 
leather boot and the canvas boot. Cotton padded 
gloves or mittens with a recess for thumb and 
trigger finger, and a halter so that they may 
hang around the neck when not in use, complete 
the winter uniform. 
120. SPECIAL-PURPOSE UNIFORMS 
a. Communist China has purchased a number 
of chemical and nuclear warfare protective 
covering suits, gloves, rubber shoes, and masks 
from Bloc nations and distributed them to some 
units. Both armored troops and paratroops 
have distinctive uniforms similar in design to 
the respective Soviet uniforms i.e., coveralls for 
armored troops and paratroops and a wide 
leather belt and close-fitting crash helmet for 
paratroopers (fig. 111). 
b. A one-piece winter camouflage coat made 
of white cloth and a Soviet-style summer 
camouflage two~piece mottled suit are issued for 
use by patrols, observers, and snipers. The 
winter uniforms usually have a white inner 
lining of cotton which may be turned inside out 
for use in snow-covered areas. Reliance also is 
placed on improvisation, e.g., sewing loops on 
the uniforms for attaching foliage, straw, etc., 
and smearing dirt or mud on the clothing and 
person to blend with the terrain. 
c. There are three items of rainwear: A 
raincoat, a waterproof cape, and a poncho-
shelter half. All are white on the reverse side. 
The raincoat has a hood which can be drawn 
about the head with a drawstring. It is fast-
ened down the center front with five buttons, of 
which four are covered with a flap when the 
coat is closed. The waterproof cape, like the 
raincoat, has a hood which fastens about the 
head by means of a drawstring. There is a slit 
on each side for the hands. The poncho-shelter-
half can be worn as a hooded cloak and serves 
as a combination windbreaker and raincoat. 
The hood covers the head and is held by means 
of a drawstring. The front can be closed by 
means of snaps, or buttoned by wooden pegs 
sewn on the shelterhalf. 
121. INSIGNIA 
a. Insignia of Grade. Officers' insignia of 
grade consists of a combinaton of stars and 
longitudinal stripes on either collar tabs or 
shoulder boards. On the field and service uni-
form, company-grade officers wear from 1 to 4 
silver stars on a red collar tab that is trimmed 
with yellow piping and has a single yellow 
longitudinal stripe; field-grade officers wear 
from 1 to 4 silver stars on a red, yellow-trimmed 
collar tab with 2 yellow longitudinal stripes; 
general officers wear from 1 to 4 gold stars on 
red collar tabs trimmed with gold piping (fig. 
112). On the dress uniform, the grade insignia 
consists of combinations of silver stars on 
yellow shoulder boards that are trimmed in red 
(fig. 113). The shoulderboards for company-
grade officers have a single red longitudinal 
stripe; those for field-grade officers have 2 red 
longitudinal stripes; those for general officers 
have no longitudinal stripes. Enlisted insignia 
of grade consists of small silver stars worn on 
untrimmed red collar tabs; noncommissioned 
officer tabs have a narrow yellow longitudinal 
stripe (fig. 112). 
b. Branch Insignia. The Chinese Communist 
infantry has no branch insignia but is identified 
by the plain red collar tabs upon which the in-
signia of grade is worn. All other branches are 
identified bi metallic branch devices-gold for 
officers, silver for enlisted personnel-worn on 
the collar tabs with the insignia of grade (fig. 
114). The collar tabs for the Air Force and 
parachute troops are sky blue; those for the 
Naval forces are black. 
c. Headgear Insignia. The headgear insignia 
worn by officers consists of a gold-edged five-
pointed star in relief on a blue background on a 
circular metal convex disk, with a wreath of 
gold rice heads and partial cog wheel in relief 
at the base of the disk. The center of the star 
bears Chinese characters in gold which read 
"Eight One", commemorating 1 August 1927, 
the date of the Chinese Communist Revolution 
and the birth of the Chinese Communist Army. 
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OFFICERS' SUMMER SERVICE ENLISTED MEN'S SUMMER 
AND FIELD UNIFORM AND FIELD UNIFORM 
Infantry Lieutenant Colonel Infantry Private 2d Class 
ENLISTED MEN'S WINTER ENLISTED MEN'S 
SERVICE (AND FIELD) OVERCOAT 
UNIFORM 
Infantry Private 2d Closs 
Infantry Lieutenant Colonel 
OFFICERS' WINTER 
DRESS UNIFORM 
Marshal 
Figure 110. Chinese Communist Uniforms. 
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OFFICERS' 
OVERCOAT 
Infantry Major 
OFFICERS' SUMMER 
DRESS UNIFORM 
Infantry Major 
97 
98 
ARMORED TROOPS 
SUMMER CAMOUFLAGE SUIT RAINCOAT 
PARATROOPS 
WATERPROOF CAPE 
WINTER CAMOUFLAGE COAT 
COMBINATION 
pONCHO-SHEL TER HALF 
Figure 111. Chinese Communist Army Uniforms-Special Purpose. 
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SUPREME MARSHAL 
COLONEL GENERAL 
SENIOR COLO NEL 
SENIOR CAPTAIN 
SENIOR SERGEANT 
GENERAL OFFICERS 
MARSHAL 
LIEUTENANT GENERAL 
FIELD-GRADE OFFICERS 
~~V 
SENIOR G ENE RAL 
MAJOR GENERAL 
COLONEL LIEUTENANT COLONEL 
~/ 
CAPTAIN FIRST LIEUTENANT 
SECOND LIEUTENANT WARRANT OFFICER 
ENLISTED MEN'S COLLAR TABS- INFANTRY 
SERGEANT CORPORAL 
PRI VA TE FIRST CLASS PRIVATE SECOND CLASS 
BRANCHES OTHER THAN INFANTRY 
SENIOR SERGEANT (M EDICAL) SERGEANT (SIGNAL) CORPORAL (ENG INEER) 
PRI VATE FIRST CLASS (ARTILLERY) PRIVATE SECOND CLASS (ARMOR) 
Figure 112. Chinese Communist Army Collar Tab Insignia of Grade for Field and Service Wear. 
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SUPREME MARSHAL MARSHAL 
SENIOR COLONEL 
SENIOR CAPTAIN CAPTAIN 
GENERAL OFFICERS 
SENIOR GENERAL COLONEL 
GENERAL 
COLONEL 
FIELD-GRADE OFFICERS 
LIEUTENANT 
COLONEL 
MAJOR 
COMPANY-GRADE OFFICERS 
LIEUTENANT 
GENERAL 
MAJOR GENERAL 
OVERCOAT 
SHOULDERBOARDS 
ALL OFFICERS 
(MAJOR SHOWN) 
1ST LIEUTENANT 2D LIEUTENANT WARRANT OFFICER SPECIAL 
SHOULDERBOARDS 
STUDENT OFFICER 
Figure 4.-Chinese Communist Army Shoulderboard Insignia of Grade for Dress Wear. 
Figure 113. Chinese Communist Army Shoulderboard Insignia of Grade for Dress Wear. 
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The headgear insignia of supreme marshals and 
marshals has a wreath of gold colored leaf orna-
mentation encircling the metal disk. Enlisted 
personnel's headgear insignia is similar to that 
worn by officers, except that it is smaller (fig. 
114). 
122. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS 
a. Chinese Communist military decorations 
are awarded for heroism, achievement, and 
exemplary service. Normally, they are worn on 
the left breast and are arranged in order of 
importance, beginning at the top on the inner 
side. Campaign medals usually are metallic 
broaches of different shapes and sizes. Report-
edly, service ribbons may be worn in lieu of 
decorations. 
b. The principal decorations and service 
medals awarded to Army personnel are listed 
below in their probable order of precedence, and 
are illustrated in figure 115. The second and 
third class medals of the Order of August, 
Order of Independence and Freedom, and Order 
of Liberation, which are similar to their respec-
tive first class awards, and the Military Hero's 
Decoration are not illustrated. Color descrip-
tions of the decorations and awards are not 
available. 
(1) Order of August 1 (first, second, and 
third classes)-awarded to personnel 
who distinguished themselves in the 
Chinese Communist Revolutionary 
War during the period from 1 August 
1927 to 6 July 1937. 
(2) Order of Independence and Freedom 
(first, second, and third classes)-
awarded to personnel who distin-
guished themselves in the Revolution-
ary War during the period of the anti-
Japanese War from 7 July 1937 to 3 
September 1945. 
(3) Order of Liberation (first, second, and 
third classes)-awarded to personnel 
who distinguished themselves in the 
Revolutionary War during the period 
of the Liberation War from 3 Septem-
ber 1945 to 30 June 1950. 
(4) Military Hero's Decoration-awarded 
only to a special group recognized 
as elite soldiers, termed "Combat 
Heroes" and "Model Troops". Combat 
Heroes are nominated for the title by 
their own unit, and Communist com-
manders regularly give verbal and 
written recognition for outstanding 
feats. 
(5) Soldiers' Distinguished Merit Medal 
Grade 2-awarded for the cause of 
the Fatherland. 
(6) Medal for Bravery-awarded for the 
liberation of North China. 
(7) Northwest China Campaign Medal-
awarded for participation in the liber-
ation of Northwest China. 
(8) North China Campaign Medal -
awarded for participation in the liber-
ation of North China. 
(9) Southwest China Campaign Medal-
awarded for participation in the liber-
ation of Southwest China. 
(10) South and Central China Campaign 
Medal-awarded for participation in 
the liberation of South and Central 
China. 
(11) Commemoration Medal-awarded for 
resisting United Nations Forces in 
Korea. 
(12) Long Live Peace Medal-awarded for 
resisting United States Forces in 
North Korea. 
(13 ) Manchurian Campaign Medal 
awarded for participation in the liber-
ation of Manchuria. 
(14) Triumphant Crossing of the Yangtze 
River Medal-awarded for participa-
tion in the triumphant crossing of the 
Yangtze River. 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
102 AGO l0012A 
Figure 115. Chinese Communist Army Awards and Decorations. 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
A GO l0012A 103 
Section III. QUARTERMASTER 
123. RA nONS 
The individual Chinese Communist soldier is 
issued approximately 3 pounds of food per day 
as his ration, but during an offensive, this is 
reduced to 2.2 pounds per day. Although in-
ferior to that of most Western Armies, the diet 
is rated considerably superior to that of the 
average Chinese civilian. The average meal 
prepared in unit kitchens consists of a combina-
tion of rice, kaoliang, millet, and soybeans. To 
supplement this diet, radishes, other vegetables, 
and meat are sometimes included in the menu. 
The principal combat ration is a baked mixture 
of soybean, corn, millet, and kaoliang that is 
soaked in water prior to consumption. Before 
an operation, each individual is issued the 
equivalent of from 5 to 7 days' rations, a part 
of which is precooked combat ration sufficient 
for 2 days. These rations are carried in a ration 
bag, 3 inches in diameter and 4 feet long, 
wrapped around the soldier's waist. In field 
operations small groups and individuals usually 
prepare their own meals. However, in rear 
areas central cooking facilities are generally 
used in feeding a sizable number 0 TOOPS (fig. 
Figure 116. Company Cook Pot. 
116). The Soviet one-pot type field kitchen may 
be used, but often the only equip1bent for small 
groups is a small pot Or two. 
124. INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT 
Quartermaster suPPlies for the individual in-
clude clothing, bedding, and pet-sonal equip-
ment. A man entering the service receives an 
initial issue of a seasonal uniform. Thereafter, 
during the months of F'ebruary or March each 
year, he receives 2 cotton summer uniforms; in 
September or October, he is issued 1 cotton-_ 
quilted winter uniform. Approximately every 
two months, he receives a pair of rubber-soled 
canvas shoes. These items last the wearer from 
issue to issue. The individual is allowed to re-
tain his summer uniforIll but is required to turn 
in his winter uniform when he receives each 
new summer issue. He is also givE'!n an initial 
issue of a cotton blanket, three towels, a leather 
belt, a raincoat, rice bowl, canteen, cup, spoon, 
and a cloth carrying bag. 
125. ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT 
QuartermastE r supplies in this category are 
quite different; rom thOSe of the United States 
Army quanenmtster supplies. It includes such 
items as medicines; signal comIllunications 
equipment; accessories for ordnance equip-
ment, such as muzzle covers, gun covers, and 
holsters; construction Illaterials; hand tools 
other than engineer tools; mess and office equip-
ment. No laundry or bath equipment is known 
to exist. Tentage is generally limited to higher 
echelon command installations when other facil-
ities are not available (fig. 117). 
Figure 117. Tents Housing a Division Field I-tospital. 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
104 
.l\.GO l0012A 
Section IV. SIGNAL 
Figure 118. Man-Packed Radio. 
126. GENERAL 
The Chinese Communists use Soviet signal 
equipment of both World War II and postwar 
design but in insufficient quantities to meet unit 
requirements. The quality of this equipment 
varies greatly; some of it, however, is of the 
latest and best Soviet design. There are an ex-
treme shortage of competent technical person-
nel and a lack of appreciation of signal com-
munications by many senior commanders. 
127. RADIO 
a. The tactical signal doctrine for radio com-
munications of the Chinese Communists is sim-
ilar to that of the Soviet Army. Radio equip-
ment is generally in short supply. Moreover, 
the Chinese have been reluctant to use radio for 
fear of compromising tactical information, and 
possibly because the equipment is old and their 
personnel untrained. Radios are classed as man-
packed, vehicular, mobile, and relay. The man-
packed radios weigh from 20 to 96 pounds and 
have a range of 3 to 30 miles (fig. 118). They 
are used for communication from regiment to 
battalion to company and by forward observer 
parties. Two of these man-packed sets are sim-
ilar to the U.S. SCR-300 and SCR-284, both 
World War II models; others are similar to 
Soviet models, while some are composites of 
several different models. Both code and voice 
transmissions are possible with these sets, some 
in combination and some singly. 
b. Vehicular radio sets are for tanks and 
other armored vehicles and can transmit on 
Figure 119. Ground-Air Communications Equipment. 
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Figure 120. Telephone lineman. 
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voice only, while receIvmg on both voice and 
code (fig. 119). Their range is from 3 to 13 
miles. Both of the known sets are patterned 
after Soviet models. Mobile radio sets are gen-
erally similar to Soviet models although one 
model is similar to the U.S. SCR-399 and SCR-
499. They have a wide range, from 12 to 1,000 
miles, and can transmit in either code or voice. 
Radio relay sets are line-of-sight and can be 
used in relay for long distance communications. 
The models known to be used by the Chinese 
Communists are imported from East Germany. 
128. WIRE 
a. The lack of radio sets forces the Chinese 
Communists to rely heavily on wire communica-
tions, but equipment is believed to be in short 
supply. Wire equipment is mostly of simple and 
conventional design (fig. 120). Field switch-
boards and telephone are of World War II de-
sign and varied quality. Soviet equipment is 
replacing U.S. equipment which is now obso-
lescent. 
b. The U.S. EE-8 and a Chinese copy are 
used, probably as standard equipment. The 
Chinese copy is inferior to the U.S. model. Sev-
eral Soviet World War II telephone models are 
in use, one of which has a range of about 12 
miles and is a fairly effective phone. These sets 
weigh less than 10 pounds, and all work on dry 
cell batteries. Switchboards, similar to those of 
U.S. World War II design, have 6-line and 12-
line capacities, and Soviet 10-line and 30-line 
models are also in use. 
Section V. ENGINEER 
129. GENERAL 
The Chinese Communists have limited quan-
tities of most types of engineer equipment. 
They must, however, rely heavily on Bloc aid, 
captured materials, and field improvisation to 
meet wartime demands. The critical lack of 
modern power equipment results in much of 
the engineer work being accomplished by sheer 
manpower. 
130. EXPLOSIVES 
The most commonly used explosives are TNT, 
picric acid, and dynamite. The use of dynamite 
as a combat explosive indicates a shortage of 
more suitable military explosives. These ex-
plosives are packing as paper-wrapped blocks, 
metal-covered prepared charges, and bangalore 
torpedoes. These items along with both electric 
and nonelectric accessories such as blasting 
caps, wire, and fuzes are manufactured in 
China, but production is sufficient only for 
peace time requirements. 
131. BRIDGING AND STREAM-CROSSING 
EQUIPMENT 
The Chinese Communists either improvise or 
use newly acquired fixed bridge equipment in 
crossing both water and dry gaps. Some old-
model Soviet stream-crossing equipment has 
recently been issued to Chinese engineer units. 
This equipment includes pneumatic 5-man re-
Figure 121. Footbridge. 
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Figure 122. Steel Ponton Boat with Engineer Demolition Team. 
connaissance boats; footbridges of hay or straw-
wrapped waterproofed floats (fig. 121) ; light 
wooden ponton boats of .3-short ton Or 21-man 
capacity suitable for ferrying or bridging (6.6 
to 33-short ton capacity) ; steel ponton boats 
of .6-ton or 25-man capacity (fig. 122) also 
suitable for ferrying (fig. 123) or bridging (6.6 
to 82.5-short ton capacity) ; and wheeled am-
phibians resembling the United States 6 x 6 
DUKW with 25-man capacity. In addition to 
undetermined numbers of the above equipment, 
there is an almost inexhaustable supply of 
civilian-type wooden boats ranging from I-man 
fishing boats to large junks. For dry-gap 
bridging, Soviet practices of improvisation are 
being followed. Bamboo and timber are being 
used in constructing short-span fixed bridges 
suitable for tanks and artillery. An unknown 
quantity of Bailey-type bridging is also avail-
able to the engineers. 
Figure 123. Ponton Ferry with T-34 (85) Medium Tank. 
132. CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT 
The Chinese Communists do not have an ade-
quate supply of heavy construction equipment 
and, therefore, are dependent upon hand labor. 
Their limited construction equipment, mostly 
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imported from Bloc countries, includes tractors 
(fig. 124), crane-shovels, scrapers, road rollers, 
air compressors, diesel, engines, rock crushers, 
and concrete mixers. These items are generally 
lightweight types with small capacity, and they 
suffer from inadequate maintenance and a lack 
of skilled operators. 
133. SPECIAL-PURPOSE EQUIPMENT 
Communist China either does not have or 
does not rely on many items of special-purpose 
engineer equipment. Infrared equipment is 
not manufactured locally or believed to be in 
possession of troop units. Water supply and 
purification equipment is not used; however, 
the individual soldier is issued purification 
tablets for use in his canteen. Camouflage nets 
and garnishing materials are available in small 
quantities, but almost complete reliance is 
placed on the use of natural materials. Electric 
equipment is inadequate. Most of the identified 
topographic equipment, including surveying, 
drafting, plotting, and map reproduction items, 
Figure 124. Bulldozer Clearing a Road. 
has been imported from both Bloc countries and 
Free World countries. Little of it is high-preci-
sion equipment. 
Section VI. CHEMICAL 
134. GENERAL 
The Chinese Communists place more em-
phasis on CBR defensive tactical doctrine than 
on offensive doctrine and are increasing their 
efforts to train all units how to meet CBR at-
tack. Training programs are emphasizing the 
instruction of the individual soldier in protec-
tion, detection, and decontamination. Protec-
tive equipment, some of which offers excellent 
protection, is an assortment of captured, Soviet-
furnished, and Chinese-manufactured material 
including masks, clothing, capes, first aid, and 
self-aid devices and decontamination equipment. 
135. GAS MASKS 
The current standard protective mask is a 
copy of the Soviet ShM-1 model which provides 
protection against standard CW agents. The 
assortment of old masks still in use will not 
protect against the newer gases because of age 
and leakage. 
136. PROTECTIVE CLOTHING 
Chinese Communist troops have been issued 
World War II Japanese and Soviet items of 
protective clothing. These suits, made of light-
weight rubberized fabric, are still serviceable 
and offer good protection against liquid agents. 
Quantities are believed adequate for training 
and possibly for a full issue to CBR personnel. 
Shelter halves have been recommended for 
protection against airplane spray attack, and 
capes have been issued to troops for training 
(fig. 125). A one-time-use reinforced paper 
garment, which would protect against most of 
the liquid agent, has been reported. Rubberized 
gloves and footwear are not in general use for 
crossing contaminated areas. 
137. DECONTAMINATION EQUIPMENT 
Some supplies of United States ointment and 
large quantities of World War II Japanese in-
dividual decontamination kits are available. 
They are effective against mustard only, and 
nothing is known of other protective devices. 
Field bathing facilities and clothing deconta-
mination facilities, both of which require a 
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Figure 125. Convoy Passing Through Contaminated 
Area. 
Figure 126. Decontamination Clothing and Equipment. 
source of heat, still appear to be scarce, so that 
large-scale decontamination of personnel and 
clothing would be difficult if not impossible. For 
immediate field use, the Chinese Communists 
have an undetermined number of Soviet man-
pack decontamination kits. They have a 3-
gallon capacity and are similar to a garden in-
secticide sprayer (fig. 126). Cistern trucks are 
available which could be converted for decon-
taminating terrain. 
138. DETECTION EQUIPMENT 
CW agent detector kits available are believed 
to be of Soviet design and capable of detecting 
current standard United States CW agents. No 
device for early warning of BW aerosol attack 
is available. Soviet radiation detection equip-
ment is mentioned in Chinese Communist open 
military publications frequently enough for it 
to be assumed that the supply is sufficient for 
training and for at least a partial issue to 
radiation reconnaissance personnel (fig. 127). 
This equipment is somewhat bulky by United 
States standards, but is sturdy and dependable 
in the field. 
Figure 127. Detection Equipment. 
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Section VII. TRANSPORTATION 
139. GENERAL 
Motor transport, although increasing in 
quantity and increasingly important in the 
Chinese Communist ground forces, is not ample 
to ~eet all demands. Wherever possible, and 
partIcularly for long distance movement, rail-
road transport is utilized; animal and human 
portage still is employed for movement over 
shorter distances. Available motor transport 
decreases rapidly from higher to lower echelons 
but in addition to those tactical units in which 
character and mission make transport essential 
(e.g., heavy artillery and armored organiza-
Figure 128. GAl 51. 
Figure 129. liS 150. 
Figure 130. GAl 63. 
tions) there are truck platoons in Infantry 
Division Rear Service Departments. 
140. WHEELED VEHICLES 
The principal vehicles in army use are the 
Soviet 21h-ton 4 x 2 GAZ 51 (fig. 128) and the 
41;2-ton 4 x 2 ZIS/ ZIL 150 trucks (fig. 129) 
and their military versions-the 4 x 4 GAZ 63 
(fig. 130), the 6 x 6 ZIS/ ZIL 151, (fig. 131) 
and the 6 x 6 ZIS 157 which has the newer 
single high flotation tires on each axle. The 
Soviet GAZ 67B and GAZ-69 jeep-type vehicles 
are also employed. Communist China now pro-
Figure 131. liS 151. 
Figure 132. "liberation" Truck (CA 10). 
Figure 133. K-800 Prime Mover Towing 85-mm Gun. 
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duces a copy of the ZIS-150 truck called the 
"Liberation" (CA 10) (fig. 132) . A number 
of other types of trucks, buses, automobiles, and 
three-wheeled motorcycles are being tested and 
produced in limited quantities. Most vehicles 
now in use are Soviet supplied. To supplement 
their military vehicle pool the Chinese Com-
munists requisition from the civilian economy. 
141. PRIME MOVERS 
The principal prime movers for light field 
and antiaircraft artillery are 4112 -ton trucks. 
The Soviet AT-S and the Hungarian K-800 are 
used for towing medium and heavy artillery 
weapons (fig. 133). 
142. AIRCRAFT 
The Chinese Communist Army uses Soviet 
light aircraft. Locally manufactured copies of 
the Soviet COLT fixed wing aircraft (fig. 134) 
and of the HOUND helicopter (fig. 135) are 
also in service. 
Figure 134. COLT. 
Figure 135. HOUND. 
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APPENDIX I. CHINESE COMMUNIST NAVAL FORCES 
Section I. GENERAL 
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Chinese Communist Navy (Naval Forces 
of the People's Liberation Army) was organ-
ized in 1949 when PLA troops gained control 
over large segments of the China coastline and 
a number of naval shore facilities fell into Com-
munist hands. Some Nationalist warships, such 
as the light cruiser CHUNGKING, defected to 
the Communists along with a considerable num-
ber of Nationalist naval personnel. These ves-
sels provided the nucleus for the Chinese Com-
munist naval forces. Naval surface elements 
which consisted of all sorts of vessels were 
deployed in conjunction with ground forma-
tions against the withdrawing Nationalist units. 
Throughout its existence, the Navy has been a 
branch of the PLA, and trusted senior Com-
munist Army officers have been in control of 
these improvised naval forces with former offi-
cers of the Nationalist Navy receiving subordi-
nate assignments in the new service. These 
ex-Nationalist officers, however, have since been 
largely replaced, as reliable Communists were 
trained to fill their assignments. 
2. CURRENT STATUS 
The Chinese Communist Navy has improved 
both the quantity of its vessels and the quality 
of its personnel with Soviet equipment and tech-
nical assistance playing a major role. While 
the Chinese have made considerable progress 
in their Navy during the last 10 years, they are 
still clearly inferior to major Western navies. 
However, its rapid and continuing growth pre-
sents an increasing threat to undisputed West-
ern control of the waters of the western Pacific. 
3. MISSION 
The mission of the Chinese Communist Navy 
is primarily defensive, with its main responsi-
bility the defense of the China coast. The Navy 
is improving its deep-water capability, as evi-
denced by construction of long-range sub-
marines (fig. 136), but it is still hindered by 
a lack of equipment and experience. The Navy 
also must be prepared to conduct amphibious 
operations. 
Figure 136. Chinese Communit "W"-Class 
long-Range Submarine. 
4. CAPABILITIES 
The Chinese Communist Navy is able to main-
tain limited coastal patrols, and it can conduct 
reconnaissance by utilizing both its air arm 
and junks disguised as fishing vessels. The 
Navy is capable of mine-laying operations, 
using either crude, handmade mines or modern 
mines supplied by the Soviets. However, the 
Chinese Communists would rely, for the most 
part, on static coastal defense installations and 
the ground forces to defend against an am-
phibious attack. From the standpoint of offen-
sive amphibious operations, the Communists 
can assemble a vast flotilla of improvised craft 
such as junks, sampans, and towed barges and 
rafts which would be difficult to stop. 
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Section II. ORGANIZATION 
5. GENERAL 
The Chinese Communist Navy is essentially 
an auxiliary arm of a basically ground force 
organization. Although the long range sub-
marine force is being developed, the Navy is 
a defensive force, and its principal vessels are 
defensive types-destroyers and destroyer es-
corts (fig. 137), motor torpedo boats (fig. 138), 
submarine chasers (fig. 139), and various other 
patrol and escort vessels of various types and 
national origin. Naval bases along the China 
coast permit operations at close range in the 
vicinity of Southeast Asia, the Philippines, 
Taiwan, and Japan. 
6. ORGANIZATION 
The Navy is organized as a major branch of 
the Ministry of National Defense, and Naval 
Headquarters operates directly under the Head-
quarters, People's Liberation Army. Subordi-
nate to this Headquarters are the fleets, which 
are the operating forces of the Chinese Com-
munist Navy, and the naval shore districts 
which provide fleet support and are responsible 
for coastal defense. Naval bases, schools, naval 
stores, and perhaps marine-type units are sub-
ordinate to these naval shore districts. 
7. flEETS 
Each of the fleets of surface craft, as well as 
the submarine fleet, is controlled by a naval 
Figure 137. Chinese Communist Destroyer Escort 
(Soviet RIGA Class). 
Figure 138. Chinese Communist Motor Torpedo Boats. 
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Figure 139. Chinese Communist Submarine Chaser. 
commander who is directly subordinate to the 
Naval Headquarters of Headquarters, PLA. 
Each naval shore district is charged with fleet 
operational support and coastal surveillance of 
a specific sea defense region. Defense regions 
are divided into defense patrol areas, the de-
fense of which is the responsibility of coastal 
surveillance craft. 
8. NAVAL AIR ARM 
The naval air arm was formed near the end 
of the Korean War after the Air Force of the 
Figure 140. Naval IL-28 (BEAGLE) Jet light Bomber. 
PLA was well established. The naval air arm 
is all land-based and includes jet fighters, jet 
light bombers (fig. 140), and piston-type trans-
port aircraft. Although the number of naval 
aircraft is small, the ratio of aircraft to surface 
vessels is adequate and the present organiza-
tion could serve as the nucleus for future ex-
pansion. The naval air regiments are prima-
rily defensive; they provide air support for the 
several fleets and for the defense of coastal 
areas and shipping. 
9. SHORE BASED UNITS 
Approximately half of the personnel strength 
of the Chinese Communist Navy serves ashore 
in various headquarters and training and base 
facilities. In addition to personnel supporting 
the operating forces or fleets, there are an un-
determined number of personnel in coastal de-
fense and naval infantry units. Naval infantry 
or marine-type units are generally similar to 
the Army infantry units in organization, weap-
ons, and equipment. These units provide the 
Navy with an amphibious assault capability 
that could be employed in large combined opera-
tions or separately in minor seaborne opera-
tions. 
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APPENDIX II. CHINESE COMMUNIST AIR FORCE 
Section I. GENERAL 
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
a. The Chinese Communist Air Force was 
organized in 1946 when a training center was 
established at Chiamussu, in eastern Manchuria, 
using Japanese air personnel and Japanese air-
craft and other equipment. However, insuffi-
cient and inadequate equipment resulted in only 
slight progress and little actual training from 
1946 to 1948. 
b. During the latter stages of the civil war 
with the Nationalists, in 1948-1949, increasing 
numbers of United States-trained Chinese Na-
tionalist air personnel defected or were cap-
tured with their aircraft. These new additions 
to the Chinese Communist Air Force made it 
possible to organize a central training installa-
tion in south-central Manchuria, with one or 
more subsidiary units in eastern Manchuria. 
c. After the establishment of the "People's 
Republic of China" · on 1 October 1949, the 
"People's Air Force Headquarters" was estab-
lished as the top echelon of the Chinese Com-
munist Air Force. This headquarters did not 
begin to organize systematically, however, until 
after the signing of · the Sino-Soviet 30-Year 
Mutual Assistance pact in February 1950. At 
that time, the Soviet Union began to furnish the 
necessary technical . guidance, aircraft, and 
equipment to develop a modern, effective air 
arm as an integral part of the Chinese Com-
munist Armed Forces. 
d. During the Korean War,Soviet assistance 
to the Chinese Communists increased, and the 
Air Force expanded rapidly during 1950 and 
1951. The poor showing made by the Chinese 
Communist pilots against United Nations air-
craft is attributed to inadequate training rather 
than to a shortage or inferiority of equipment. 
After the Korean War, the Chinese Communist 
Air Force continued to expand until it became 
the fourth largest air force in the world. 
2. CURRENT STATUS 
The combat elements of the Chinese Com-
munist Air Force are equipped with Soviet jet 
fighters and jet light and medium bombers. 
The backbone of the Air Force is the jet 
fighters, principally the MIG-15 (FAGOT) 
and MIG-17 (FRESCO) (figs. 141 and 142). 
Figure 141. Captured MIG.--15 (FAGOT). 
Figure 142. MIG-17 (FRESCO). 
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They have recently acquired a limited number 
of MIG-19's (FARMER) (fig. 143). For 
ground attack and support operations, the Chi-
nese Communists use the propellor-driven Il-
10 (BEAST). Their bomber force is equipped 
with two types of light bombers-the jet Il-28 
(BEAGLE) (fig. 144) and the propellor-driven 
Tu-2 (BAT). The Air Force has only a few 
Tu-4 (BULL) medium bombers, which are 
Soviet copies of the U.S. B-29 (fig. 145). The 
principal transport aircraft of the Chinese Com-
munist Air Force are the Li-2 (CAB), which 
is a Soviet copy of the U.S. C-47, and the Il-12 
(COACH). In addition to providing most of 
the Air Force's materiel, the Soviets continue 
to assist with training, but the Chinese Com-
Figure 143. MIG-1 9 (FARMER). 
Figure 144. 11-28 (BEAGLE). 
Figure 145. Tu-4 (BUll). 
munists are moving toward self-sufficiency in 
this sphere. Nevertheless, continued Chinese 
Communist dependence upon the Soviet Union 
for equipment and aviation fuel results in con-
siderable Soviet influence over the development 
of the Air Force. The principal weakness is 
the low level of pilot proficiency demonstrated 
during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis when the 
Chinese Communist formations were repeatedly 
defeated by the outnumbered Chinese National-
ists. 
3. MISSION 
The Chinese Communist Air Force has the 
tactical mission of providing air defense, pro-
viding close support for the ground forces, in-
terdiction of battle areas, and the airlift of 
personnel and supplies in support of ground 
operations. Although the Air Force is organ-
ized and equipped primarily for the defensive 
and tactical role, it medium bomber components 
have a limited strategic mission which would 
include attacks against enemy lines of com-
munication, rear area supply concentrations, 
manufacturing complexes, .and communications 
centers. The light bombardment elements would 
be employed tactically to disrupt forward com-
munications and supply installations. Because 
of the lack of an appreciable long-range force, 
the capability of the Air Force to accomplish 
these missions is contingent upon both the 
area in which it is operating and the quality 
of the forces opposing it. 
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Section II. ORGANIZATION 
4. GENERAL 
The Air Force is a major component of the 
Chinese Communist Armed Forces which are 
predominantly ground force in character. The 
Air Force is controlled from the Air Force 
Headquarters within the Headquarters, People's 
Liberation Army. The Air Force is dominated 
by the ground forces, inasmuch as the Head-
quarters is subordinate to the staff departments 
of the Headquarters, PLA, and former ground 
force officers still occupy senior positions within 
the Air Force. Within the PLA command and 
administrative structure, the Air Force Head-
quarters occupies a position generally compar-
able to the Naval Headquarters and the head-
quarters of the various other branches of serv-
ice, i.e., armor, artillery, etc. 
5. COMMAND STRUCTURE 
The Air Force Headquarters within Head-
quarters, PLA, maintains general operational 
and administrative control over all Air Force 
units and installations. However, the Air Head-
quarters of the Military Region has consider-
able freedom in local administration, and the 
commander of the regional air headquarters 
has a large measure of control over the air 
operations of tactical units within his region. 
In peacetime, the Air Force Headquarters at 
the PLA level may directly command tactical 
units in the fielu. In an active wartime theater, 
the theater commander has operational control 
of the air units assigned to his command. 
6. TACTICAL ORGANIZATION 
The basic combat unit in the Air Force is 
the air regiment, which normally is equipped 
with 37 aircraft. The regiment is further 
divided into three squadrons for tactical con-
trol. The largest combat organization is the air 
division, believed to consist of from two to 
three regiments. These air units are supported 
by independent aircraft maintenance and air-
field operating elements, and ground-controlled 
intercept units. 
Section III. OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE GROUND FORCES 
7. GENERAL 
Although the principal mISSIOn of the Air 
Force is air defense, its potential for offensive 
operations is growing, and it can be expected 
to support the offensive and defensive opera-
tions of the ground forces in any future opera-
tional situation that may develop. Their opera-
tional doctrine is patterned after that of the 
Soviet Union, particularly in the dominance 
of ground commanders in air-ground coordina-
tion. 
8. CONTROL AND COORDINATION 
Chinese Communist air support doctrine in-
dicates that overall control is centralized at the 
wartime army group level or theater level. 
Coordination is insured through the exchange 
of air and ground liaison personnel. Target 
areas and time of attack are determined by the 
ground commander. The detailed planning of 
the air support mission is the responsibility of 
the air commander, and the operations are di-
rected from his command post or from the com-
mand post of the ground commander through 
air staff representatives. The air liaison offi-
cers detailed to the command post or headquar-
ters of the tactical ground commander assure 
continued coordination between air and ground 
units in the battle area and transmit the re-
quirements of the ground commander to the air 
commander. The air liaison officer keeps the 
air commander informed of all changes in both 
the ground and air situation. 
9. OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS 
Air support of the ground attack is provided 
by both ground attack and bomber aircraft. 
Air strikes are either preplanned, executed 
upon the request of the ground commander, or 
carried out on the initiative of the air com-
mander. Strikes are synchronized with the lift-
ing of friendly artillery fire. The air offensive 
action includes the neutralization of enemy 
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weapons, target spotting, impeding enemy coun-
terattacks, disruption of the routes from the 
enemy rear to the battle area, and protection of 
friendly troops from air attack at the point of 
main effort. 
10. DEFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS 
In the defense, air units support the actions 
of both the general and combat outpost forces 
and the forces in the main defense zone. In the 
defensive situation, the ground commander uti-
lizes combat aviation to attack the enemy dur-
ing his approach march and in his assembly 
areas; to support the defensive fire plan; to 
strike at enemy artillery, tanks, forward air-
fields, and reserves; to attack an enemy force 
that has broken through or penetrated in depth; 
and to protect friendly forces from air attack. 
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APPENDIX III. THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE 
1. THE GENERAL PATTERN OF THE COM-
MUNIST REGIME IN CHINA 
The Chinese Communists rule more than 650 
million people who live in an area one-fourth 
larger than the area of the United States. Com-
munist China is a monolithic dictatorship of the 
Chinese Communist Party; the Chinese Com-
munist Army is the principal instrument 
through which the Party gained and currently 
maintains control. The Chinese Communist 
Government, Party, and Army are, in effect, 
inseparable, and the same small group of Com-
munist leaders dominates all three. Since 1949, 
the Chinese Communist regime has consoli-
dated its control over the mainland of China 
through a policy of incentives and repression 
and large-scale mobilization of the masses. 
Communist China is bound to the Soviet 
Union by close ideological, economic, and mili-
tary ties and has been playing an important role 
in the spread of international Communism in 
Asia. The Chinese Communist Armed Forces 
may be expected to continue to take a significant 
part in the development and execution of Com-
munist military programs in eastern Asia. 
The rapid development of the Chinese Com-
munist Army within the last 30 years, from a 
small guerrilla force to one of the world's 
largest armies, is reflected in the nature of the 
leadership, organization, tactics, and equipment 
of this Army today. The Chinese Communists, 
however, have had control of the mainland of 
China for just over a decade. Hence, in a study 
of the nature and potential of the relatively 
young Chinese Communist Army, it is desirable 
to have at least a general understanding of 
China's history, geography, economy, and 
people. 
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
a. Historically, China was for several thou-
and years the center of civilization and culture 
in east Asia. China is separated from Europe 
and south-central Asia by mountain barriers 
and desert wastes, and it was not until the 19th 
Century that China was strongly influenced by 
developments in the Western world. China's 
modern relations with the West developed dur-
ing the 19th Century, when major European 
Powers demanded and received special privi-
leges or grants of territory on long-term leases 
from the weak and decadent Manchu rulers of 
China. The partitioning of China by European 
Powers into spheres of influence was checked 
mainly by strong United States support of 
China's territorial integrity. The principal ex-
ternal threat to China during the first four 
decades of the 20th Century came from the ex-
panding Japanese Empire, which had extended 
its control over a large part of China prior to 
Japan's surrender in 1945. 
b. Simultaneously with strong external pres-
sures upon China during the last century, the 
country was undergoing a series of internal 
political and social upheavals. The ruling 
Manchu dynasty, weakened by internal rebel-
lions and defeated in war by several European 
Powers and Japan, was overthrown in 1912 , 
and the Republic of China was established. The 
new Republic was beset by many pressing do-
mestic and foreign problems, the most impor-
tant of which after 1931 were Communist revo-
lution and Japanese aggression. 
c. Although World War II removed the Japa-
nese threat to China, it also seriously weakened 
the Government of the Republic and presented 
the Communists with the long-awaited oppor-
tunity to build up their strength for a final 
showdown with the Kuomintang (National 
People's Party) which was in control of the 
Government. The Chinese Communists, in 
1949, succeeded in driving the Nationalist Gov-
ernment from the mainland of China. Taiwan, 
present seat of the Government of the Republic 
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of China, is also claimed by the Communists as 
a part of their "Peoples' Republic of China," 
which was proclaimed on 1 October 1949. Since 
the Communists gained hegemony over the 
mainland, they have striven to develop China 
into a modern industrial country. Considerable 
progress has been made but at the cost of almost 
complete regimentation of the Chinese people. 
3. CHINA'S GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING 
a. Communist China encompasses an area of 
3,500,000 square miles. It is a country of great 
geographic diversity varying from heavily for-
ested mountains of the semitropical North 
Vietnam-China border area to the barren 
tundra plateaus and rugged mountain ranges of 
northern Manchuria and from densely popu-
lated temperate plains and river basins in 
East China to the gravel land and sand deserts 
of the Northwest. Throughout history, China's 
physical isolation has hampered communication 
with neighboring States and has retarded in-
ternal development. With improved internal 
transport, however, and the resettlement of 
large numbers of Chinese in border areas a 
gradual change of basic orientation from a mar-
itime Power to a continental land Power is 
taking place. This reorientation is already re-
flected in the regime's strategic thinking and in 
relations with neighboring States. 
b. Between 75 and 80 percent of the Chinese 
people are farmers, who live mainly in the fer-
tile basins of the Yellow River in North China, 
the Yangtze River in Central China, and the 
West River in South China. These heavily popu-
lated areas are contained in what generally has 
been known as "China proper". 
c. Peripheral areas, including Tibet, Sin-
kiang, and Inner Mongolia, in southwestern 
and northwestern China, are dominated by lofty 
mountains, high plateaus, and broad deserts, 
which render them generally unsuitable for ex-
tensive agriculture. These areas are relatively 
thinly populated, but migration to these areas 
is increasing. Manchuria, China's northwestern 
frontier, however, has rich agricultural and 
industrial resources, and its population is prob-
ably increasing even more rapidly. 
4. ECONOMIC TRENDS 
a. The backbone of the Chinese economy is 
agriculture. Although only 10 to 12 percent of 
China's total area is arable, the regime is mak-
ing a concerted effort to bring marginal lands 
under production by the construction of irriga-
tion projects and the use of fertilizers. Com-
munist China remains, however, a country of 
too many people on too little cultivated land. 
Furthermore, the pressure of the people on the 
land is increasing steadily from year to year. 
Today, the average Chinese farm family be-
longs to a commune. Members cultivate the 
land of the commune in primitive fashion. 
After obligatory state collections are made in 
kind from the total production of the commune, 
the average family is aHoted enough to keep it 
at a bare subsistence level until the next crop 
is harvested. Rice is the main crop in the moist 
southeastern and east-central China, and wheat, 
millet, and other cereals are the principal crops 
in relatively dry northern and northeastern 
China. 
b. China has significant mineral reserves, but 
they are to a large extent untapped mainly be-
cause of inaccessabilityand the lack of adequate 
equipment and technicians. China's petroleum 
resources are also larger than first believed but 
remain in large part unexploited. Industry is 
concentrated in the more accessible coastal 
areas, but a program is well advanced to de-
velop industrial cities inland near newly located 
strategic commodity reserves and away from 
the more vulnerable coastal areas. China's in-
dustrial output is now weighted on the side of 
heavY industry since the building of large steel 
complexes in the northwest and in central China 
and the implementation of the campaign to con-
struct spare-time or backyard steel furnaces. 
Industrial output of consumer goods, even 
though overshadowed by the expansion of heavY 
industry, remains important with the cotton 
textile industry being preeminent. 
c. The Chinese Communists produce most of 
their small arms and ammunition, and they are 
producing artillery pieces and motor vehicles in 
limited quantities. However, they are still de-
pendent upon imports from other Bloc countries 
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for most heavy weapons, armored vehicles and 
complex equipment. 
d. Communist China has a tremendous man-
power potential, but most of her manpower is 
only partially trained at best. Shortages of 
engineers, technicians, doctors, and other types 
of technically skilled personnel still exist, but 
these shortages are being overcome in part by 
recent graduates from Chinese institutions of 
higher learning and individuals sent to the 
U.S.S.R. for advanced schooling. Efforts to 
overcome the shortages in trained manpower 
by advanced schooling are offset somewhat by 
the disproportionate amount of time spent in 
political indoctrination. 
5. THE PEOPLE OF COMMUNIST CHINA 
a. About 90 percent of the people living in 
Communist China are of Chinese stock. The 
remainder are from various minority nation-
ality groups including the Mongols, Manchus, 
Tibetans, Koreans, Turkomans, and many 
others. The Chinese people themselves are a 
mixture of many stocks, for, through their long 
history, they have absorbed many invaders and 
aboriginal peoples. The Manchu and Mongol 
strains are more prevalent in northern China, 
where the average Chinese generally is taller 
and more rugged than his southern neighbor. 
In southern China, the people are smaller, more 
temperamental, and less amenable to discipline. 
It is significant that Chinese revolutions usually 
have had their roots in southern China and that 
the greatest resistance potential to Communism 
in China today probably is centered in this area. 
b. Although written Chinese is universally 
understood by educated Chinese, the Chinese 
people have no universal spoken language. 
Mandarin, the dialect of the northern Chinese" 
has been adopted as the official national lan-
guage among the educated Chinese and govern-
ment officials. But among the peasant popula-
tion, from which most Communist troops are 
drawn, there is a variety of dialects. Each 
dialect usually is understood only by the natives-
of a particular area. In the armed forces, efforts-
are made to minimize this language problem by 
grouping individuals speaking a common dia-
lect into one unit. 
c. The most recent innovation in the field of 
the written language is the current program to 
introduce Pinyin, a national phonetic language 
system, to replace Chinese characters. This-
effort to romanize and thus simplify the Chi-
nese language has been made necessary by the 
requirements of modern technology and the 
need to eradicate widespread illiteracy among 
the people, so they can be politically indoctri-
nated in the shortest time possible. 
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